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We propose three research problems to explore the relations between trust
and security in the setting of distributed computation. In the first problem, we
study trust-based adversary detection in distributed consensus computation. The
adversaries we consider behave arbitrarily disobeying the consensus protocol. We
propose a trust-based consensus algorithm with local and global trust evaluations.
The algorithm can be abstracted using a two-layer structure with the top layer
running a trust-based consensus algorithm and the bottom layer as a subroutine
executing a global trust update scheme. We utilize a set of pre-trusted nodes,
headers, to propagate local trust opinions throughout the network. This two-layer
framework is flexible in that it can be easily extensible to contain more complicated
decision rules, and global trust schemes.
The first problem assumes that normal nodes are homogeneous, i.e. it is
guaranteed that a normal node always behaves as it is programmed. In the second
and third problems however, we assume that nodes are heterogeneous, i.e, given
a task, the probability that a node generates a correct answer varies from node
to node. The adversaries considered in these two problems are workers from the
open crowd who are either investing little efforts in the tasks assigned to them or
intentionally give wrong answers to questions.
In the second part of the thesis, we consider a typical crowdsourcing task that
aggregates input from multiple workers as a problem in information fusion. To cope
with the issue of noisy and sometimes malicious input from workers, trust is used
to model workers’ expertise. In a multi-domain knowledge learning task, however,
using scalar-valued trust to model a worker’s performance is not sufficient to re-
flect the worker’s trustworthiness in each of the domains. To address this issue,
we propose a probabilistic model to jointly infer multi-dimensional trust of work-
ers, multi-domain properties of questions, and true labels of questions. Our model
is very flexible and extensible to incorporate metadata associated with questions.
To show that, we further propose two extended models, one of which handles in-
put tasks with real-valued features and the other handles tasks with text features
by incorporating topic models. Our models can effectively recover trust vectors of
workers, which can be very useful in task assignment adaptive to workers’ trust in
the future. These results can be applied for fusion of information from multiple
data sources like sensors, human input, machine learning results, or a hybrid of
them. In the second subproblem, we address crowdsourcing with adversaries under
logical constraints. We observe that questions are often not independent in real life
applications. Instead, there are logical relations between them. Similarly, workers
that provide answers are not independent of each other either. Answers given by
workers with similar attributes tend to be correlated. Therefore, we propose a novel
unified graphical model consisting of two layers. The top layer encodes domain
knowledge which allows users to express logical relations using first-order logic rules
and the bottom layer encodes a traditional crowdsourcing graphical model. Our
model can be seen as a generalized probabilistic soft logic framework that encodes
both logical relations and probabilistic dependencies. To solve the collective infer-
ence problem efficiently, we have devised a scalable joint inference algorithm based
on the alternating direction method of multipliers.
The third part of the thesis considers the problem of optimal assignment under
budget constraints when workers are unreliable and sometimes malicious. In a real
crowdsourcing market, each answer obtained from a worker incurs cost. The cost
is associated with both the level of trustworthiness of workers and the difficulty of
tasks. Typically, access to expert-level (more trustworthy) workers is more expensive
than to average crowd and completion of a challenging task is more costly than a
click-away question. In this problem, we address the problem of optimal assignment
of heterogeneous tasks to workers of varying trust levels with budget constraints.
Specifically, we design a trust-aware task allocation algorithm that takes as inputs
the estimated trust of workers and pre-set budget, and outputs the optimal assign-
ment of tasks to workers. We derive the bound of total error probability that relates
to budget, trustworthiness of crowds, and costs of obtaining labels from crowds nat-
urally. Higher budget, more trustworthy crowds, and less costly jobs result in a
lower theoretical bound. Our allocation scheme does not depend on the specific de-
sign of the trust evaluation component. Therefore, it can be combined with generic
trust evaluation algorithms.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.0.1 Security issues in distributed computation
Distributed computation plays an important role in solving many real-world
large-scale problems such as estimation of temperature using a network of sensors,
image annotation by a pool of human workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
In the temperature estimation example, a network of sensors collaborate by
executing a distributed consensus algorithm to reach an estimation of the average
temperature of all nodes using only local information. This type of distributed com-
putation does not have supervisors. Nodes in the network collaborate to accomplish
a common task with local communication as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Another ap-
plication that fits these scenaria is a network of robots, each running a distributed
consensus algorithm, collaborating to reach consensus on where to go for a rescue
task. Each node in the network is supposed to run a local update algorithm by
exchanging local information with its neighbors within communication range. In
the existence of malicious nodes however, this is not the case. Communication
links might be jammed [1] and nodes in the network might be hacked and behave
arbitrarily [2, 3].





































Figure 1.2: Distributed computation with supervisors.
distributing tasks to a group of workers who collaborate to give annotations to given
images. Their answers are then sent back to the supervisor for information fusion.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. Data contributed by workers are noisy and
many times malicious. In real applications (crowdsourcing platforms), some workers
want to make easy money by investing little effort in understanding the task assigned
to them and giving random answers.
2
1.0.2 Main contributions and thesis organization
In this dissertation, we aim to answer the following questions: (1) How to
develop a trust model of nodes and integrate it within a distributed consensus algo-
rithm in the face of adversaries to effectively detect adversaries; (2) In distributed
computation without supervisors (crowdsourcing) with malicious workers, how to
develop a graphical model that estimates questions’ true labels more accurately by
taking into consideration workers’ trust values; (3) How to allocate tasks to workers
of different trust values in order to minimize error probability rate subject to a bud-
get constraint. The first question assumes that normal nodes are homogeneous, i.e.
it is guaranteed that a normal node always behaves as it is programmed. In the sec-
ond and third questions however, we assume that nodes are heterogeneous, i.e, given
a task, the probability that a node generates a correct answer varies from node to
node. The adversaries considered in this problem are workers from the open crowd
who are either investing little efforts in the tasks assigned to them or intentionally
give wrong answers to questions. The main contributions of this dissertation are
summarized below.
1.0.2.1 Trust Models For Distributed Consensus With Adversaries
To address the first question, we propose a trust model with various deci-
sion rules based on local evidences in the setting of Byzantine adversaries. Our
trust-aware algorithm is flexible and can be easily extended to incorporate more
complicated designs of trust models and decision rules. We provide theoretical se-
3
curity performance with respect to miss detection rate and false alarm rate under
a regular trust graph assumption and provide a security performance bound under
general trust graph assumptions. The therectical results indicate that both error
rates decreases exponentially with respect to the number of headers. Simulations
show that our proposed trust-aware consensus algorithm can effectively detect vari-
ous malicious strategies even in sparse networks where connectivity < 2f + 1, where
f is the number of adversaries.
1.0.2.2 Worker Trust In Crowdsourcing With Adversaries
To answer the second question, we formulate a probabilistic model of crowd-
sourcing tasks with multi-domain characteristics and propose a novel inference
method based on variational inference. Our model is very flexible and can be eas-
ily extended. In applications where each question comes with a feature vector, we
further develop an extended model that handles questions with continuously-valued
features. We further extend the model by combining a multi-domain crowdsourc-
ing model with topic discovery based on questions’ text descriptions and derive an
analytical solution to the collective variational inference.
We assumed the true labels of different questions and the trust values of work-
ers are independent. However, our domain knowledge tells us that there might be
logical constraints between the true labels of questions as well as between the trust
values of different workers. To incorporate domain knowledge, we formulate a novel
trust-aware crowdsourcing with domain knowledge framework that combines domain
4
knowledge with a traditional crowdsourcing graphical model. Users can express high
level domain knowledge without having to re-define the model and the framework
can be used to integrate multiple data sources. We also develop a scalable joint
inference algorithm for estimating true label variables and trust values of workers
based on alternating consensus optimization. The inference algorithm can be easily
scaled to multiple machines.
1.0.2.3 Trust-Aware Optimal Crowdsourcing With Budget Constraint
We answer the last question by formulating the problem of trust-aware task
allocation in crowdsourcing and provide a principled way to solve it. Our formulation
models the workers’ trustworthiness and the costs depend on both the question
and the worker group. Our method is ready to be extended to more complicated
aggregation methods other than the weighted majority vote as well. The trust-aware





B), where N is the number of tasks and B is the total budget. Different
from [4], the exact performance bound of error probability also incorporates both
trustworthiness of crowds and cost. More trustworthy crowds and less costly jobs
result in lower guaranteed bound.
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Chapter 2: Trust Models For Distributed Consensus With Adver-
saries
2.1 Background on distributed consensus algorithms
In distributed systems, nodes in the network are programmed to calculate given
functions of nodes’ values. However, due to message transmission delays, crashes,
value domain errors, or even Byzantine behavior of malicious nodes, different nodes
would probably have different views of the input vector of these parameters. Con-
sensus requires that every correct agent in the network reach an agreement on some
value. We will study the problem of consensus in the face of Byzantine adversaries.
The issue of consensus has been investigated for decades in the computer
science, communication and control communities. There are mainly two types of
failures discussed. One is crash failures and the other is Byzantine failures. A crash
failure refers to the case when a process stops working, while in a Byzantine failure,
a process may send arbitrary data to other processes. Byzantine failures are far
more disruptive since they allow arbitrary behaviors.
In the computer science community, the consensus problem is to design a
distributed protocol that allows processes to agree on a single decision value, which
6
should be one of the initial values. Based on different failure types, oracle-based
consensus protocols [5] and condition-based approaches [6] have been proposed to
achieve the goal. For asynchronous distributed systems, Chandra and Toeug [7]
introduced the concept of Failure Detector (FD) and showed that with FD, consensus
can be achieved and possible failure processes can be found. In [8] a probabilistic
solution was applied to solve the consensus problem under Byzantine failures with
the condition fb <
1
5
n, where n is the total number of processes and fb is the
number of Byzantine failures. The leader-based consensus developed by Mostefaoui
et al [5]. required fc <
1
2
n to reach consensus with crash failures, where fc is
the number of crash failures, and the time and message costs of the protocol can
be reduced when fc <
1
3
n. Later in [6], the leader oracle approach, the random
oracle approach and the condition-based approach are combined to provided a hybrid
consensus protocol. [9] connected Error-Correcting Codes (ECC) to the condition-
based approach and showed that consensus can be solved despite fc crash failures
if and only if the condition can be mapped to a code whose Hamming distance is
fc + 1, and Byzantine consensus can be solved despite fb Byzantine faults when the
Hamming distance of the code is 2fb + 1.
Different from the consensus problem discussed in the computer science com-
munity, consensus in a network of connected agents means reaching an agreement
regarding the states (or values of certain agent variables) of all (benign) agents that
are used in computing certain functions (or function). Without considering failures,
for a certain node, the consensus process can be as simple as using a weighted aver-
age of its neighbors’ states [10]. Ren [11,12] proposed update schemes for consensus
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under dynamically changing directed interaction topologies, provided that the union
of the directed interaction graphs have a spanning tree frequently enough as the sys-
tem evolves. However the linear updating rules may not be resilient to misbehaving
nodes. It was shown in [13] that a single misbehaving node can cause all agents to
reach consensus on a wrong value, which potentially will result in a dangerous situa-
tion in physical systems. The framework for posing and solving consensus problems
for multi-agent networked systems was analyzed in [13, 14], where key results on
the theory and applications of consensus problems in networked systems are pre-
sented. [15] showed that the resilience of a partially connected network to Byzantine
adversaries is characterized by its network topology, and a well-behaving agent can
calculate any arbitrary function of all node values when the number of malicious
nodes (f) is less than 1/2 of the network connectivity, i.e the connectivity should be
at least 2f+1. [3] used system theory to reach a similar conclusion regarding network
connectivity, requiring that the number of disjoint paths between any two nodes in
the network should be greater than twice the number of adversaries. LeBlanc et
al. developed the Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) [16, 17], which
applied ideas from both the consensus algorithms resilient to Byzantine faults in
distributed computing and the linear consensus protocols used for coordination of
networked agents, and formulated the problem into a linear control problem where
consensus could be reached among cooperative agents via agreement and validation
conditions.
Applications of both kinds of consensus problems and formulations are appro-
priate for, and have been used in our earlier work, distributed filtering and estimation
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in heterogeneous sensor networks networks with applications to power grids [18–20].
A Model-Based Systems Engineering framework for distributed heterogeneous sen-
sor networks was presented in [21].
Network connectivity conditions in most previous works are hard to satisfy
in reality. In addition, the robustness condition in [16] is itself hard to verify.
These facts motivate us to design a Byzantine adversary detection scheme based
on trust evaluation. We introduce the notion of trust in the context of consensus
algorithms with Byzantine adversaries. Works related to the application of trust to
distributed algorithms inlcude [18,20] who embedded trust evaluation in distributed
Kalman filtering (DKF) with applications to sensor networks in power grids, and [22]
who proposed the RoboTrust algorithm in consensus algorithms. Our work differs
from [22] in the following ways: 1) The trust model is different; and 2) Trust in [22] is
established only by local evidence while our trust model also depends on second-hand
evidence. 3) Trust propagation in evaluating global trust is resistant to malicious
voting. In addition to the empirical results reported in our previous work [23], we
provide a theoretical bound on the miss detection rate and false alarm rate for the
result of trust propagation for both a regular trust graph assumption and a general
trust graph assumption. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a trust model with various decision rules based on local evidences
in the setting of Byzantine adversaries.
• Our trust-aware algorithm is flexible and can be easily extended to incorporate
more complicated designs of trust models and decision rules.
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• We provide theoretical security performance with respect to miss detection
rate and false alarm rate under a regular trust graph assumption and provide
security performance bound under a general trust graph assumption. The
therectical results indicate that both error rates decrease exponentially with
respect to the number of headers.
• Simulations show that our proposed trust-aware consensus algorithm can ef-
fectively detect various malicious strategies even in sparse networks where
connectivity < 2f + 1, where f is the number of adversaries.
2.2 Definitions of adversaries
Consider a communication network modeled by a directed graph G(k) =
(V,E(k)), where V denotes the set of nodes in the network and E(k) the set of
edges at time k. If eij(k) ∈ E(k), it means node i can hear node j’s message at time
k, i.e. node j is a neighboring node of i at time k. Whether node i is able to receive
node j’s message depends on their relative distance and j’s transmission power. A
node can reach a larger portion of nodes in the network if it transmits messages with
higher power. Let Ni(k) = {j|eij(k) ∈ E(k), j 6= i} denote the set of neighbor nodes
that node i can hear from at time k, and N+i (k) = Ni(k)
⋃
{i} denote the extended
neighbor set of node i at time k. We assume all nodes’ transmission power is fixed.
Therefore we have Ni(k) = Ni,∀k ≥ 0.
Let X(k) denote the N -dimensional vector of all nodes’ states at time k. The
10




wij (k)xj (k − 1) + wii (k)xi (k − 1) (2.1)
where X(k) = [x1(k), x2(k), · · · , xN(k)]T , and xi(k) denotes node i’s updated state
at time k and wij(k) > 0, j 6= i is the weight that node i puts on node j’s belief at
the previous time instant for the calculation of its state update. wii(k) > 0 is the
weight that node i puts on its own previous state. Coefficients are normalized and
satisfy
∑
j∈Ni(k)wij(k) + wii(k) = 1. We denote by W (k) the N × N matrix with
elements Wij(k). Equation (2.1) is a standard module where all nodes are normal.
In a distributed environment, due to lack of central monitoring, nodes are
subject to various attacks. In the worst case, some nodes might be hacked and do
not function as they are originally programmed. We consider the following Byzantine
adversary model:
Definition 2.2.1. A Byzantine adversary may behave arbitrarily. It does not
follow the prescribed distributed consensus update rule, i.e. at some time instant
k > 0, a Byzantine adversary i sends incorrect message vi(k) other than xi(k)
in equation (2.1) to its neighbors. We assume a broadcast model here, meaning
adversaries send the same message to different neighbors. In addition, the adversary
is assumed to have complete knowledge of the network topology, the states of all other
nodes in the network, and the consensus update rule for all nodes.
Next, we define a normal node’s behavior and the information it can get access
to.
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Definition 2.2.2. A normal node behaves according to the distributed consensus
specification, i.e. it updates its states by combining the messages received from its
neighbors using the specified coefficients. The normal node has access to just local
information such as from its neighborhood, the messages sent by them, the coeffi-
cients it uses for updating states. Moreover, it does not know whether a neighbor is
normal or malicious.
From the above definitions, we can see that a normal node i has no way of
determining whether one of its neighbors j is malicious or not since it can not get
access to all the messages sent by its 2-hop neighbors l ∈ Nj \ {i}. To detect mali-
cious nodes locally, we introduce the trust model and establish local trust between
nodes based on first-hand evidence and define several decision rules that map from
local evidence to local decisions. Often local evidence is not sufficient to reach use-
ful decisions. We therefore define global trust based on both first-hand evidence
and evidence of other nodes in the network. Our proposed trust-aware consensus
algorithm takes global trust values as input.
2.3 Trust model
There are two possible connections from node i to node j. One is communi-
cation connection. If j ∈ Ni(k), node j is said to be in the communication neigh-
borhood of node i at time instant k. The other is trust connection. Denote the set
of trust relations at time instant k as Ec(k). A directed edge from node i to node j,
denoted as ecij(k) ∈ Ec(k), represents the trust relation node i has towards node j.
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We assume that if there is communication connection from node i to node j at time
k, there must exist a trust relation eci,j(l),∀l ≥ k since node i receives messages from
node j at time k which forms the direct evidence for i to evaluate j’s trustworthi-
ness at the current iteration k and future iterations. However, if there exists trust
relation ecij(k), the communication connection eij does not necessarily exist because
the trust relation is possibly derived from indirect observations of other nodes in
the network.
We associate a local trust value cij(k) ∈ [0, 1) with the trust connection
ecij(k) ∈ Ec(k). It represents the belief node i holds about j at time instant k
based on its local interactions with node j. The value cij(k) can be seen, in node
i’s perspective, as the probability of node j behaving normally at time instant k. It
depends on both the interaction between i and j at time k and history records i has
on node j. We utilize the Beta reputation system [24] to model local trust values.
Denote the probability that node j behaves normally at time instant k in node i’s




Γ (αij(k) + βij(k))




where Γ is Gamma distribution. Let rij(k) = αij(k)− 1 and sij(k) = βij(k)− 1, to
represent the number of events that node j is normal and the number of events j
is malicious up to time k in the perspective of node i respectively. The local trust
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value cij(k) is defined to be the mean value of pij(k), i.e.
cij(k) = E [pij(k)] =
rij(k) + 1
rij(k) + sij(k) + 2
(2.3)
Considering the time-varying behavior of node j, old records are less important than
more recent observations. We introduce positive forgetting factors ρ1 and ρ2 such
that
rij(k + 1) = ρ1rij(k) + fij(k + 1)
sij(k + 1) = ρ2sij(k) + 1− fij(k + 1),
(2.4)
where the trust decision fij(k+ 1) equals to 1 if node i believes that node j behaves
normally at time k + 1 and equals 0 otherwise. In practice, we may choose ρ1 < ρ2
so that bad behaviors are remembered for longer period of time relative to good
behaviors. Note that fij(k + 1) can also take fractional values from [0, 1] which
allows us to encode the uncertainty of local decisions. We consider two realizations
of fij(k+ 1): the local trust decision Iij(k+ 1) and the global trust decision GIij(k).
Iij(k + 1) is obtained from direct local evidence while GIij(k + 1) is calculated by
propagating local trust decisions from other nodes in the network. We will discuss
each of them below.
2.3.1 Local trust evaluation
We now discuss the question of evaluating the local trust decision Iij(k) based
on node i’s local observation about node j at time instant k, which involves the
interplay of the consensus algorithm and the trust computation. To answer this
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question, we have to examine what can be used as local evidence for node i to
determine whether a neighbor j behaves normally or maliciously at time instant
k. Essentially, we want to find a mapping from trust evidence to a binary decision.
There are many choices of evidences available and the mapping can also be arbitrary.
Denote the values vj(k) received from j ∈ Ni(k) as the vector ri(k). We discuss three
decision rules (mappings) below. One is based on clustering schemes, the second is
based on the distance of the messages, and the third on the consistency of 2-hop
messages.
2.3.1.1 Clustering-based Decision Rule
The motivation behind clustering-based decision rules is the observation that
the malicious node’s message tends to deviate from normal nodes’ messages. There-
fore the node whose message is far away from the rest is likely to be malicious.
Formally, we define the deviation of a message sent by node j from the all other







The ranking of the deviation in equation (2.5) itself can not indicate whether node
j is malicious or not because a normal node might be the one deviating the most
when convergence is almost reached and all nodes’ messages are close to each other.
15
Therefore we propose a decision rule based on relative ranking:
Iij(k) =

1 if devij(k) ≤ Thi ∗median ({devij(k)})
0 otherwise
(2.6)
where Thi is the threshold used by node i and median(·) denotes the median of
values within the bracket. The above decision rule reflects the heuristics that the
node whose message is too far away from the median is deemed to be malicious.
2.3.1.2 Distance-based Decision Rule
Denote the distance between node i’s state at time instant k, xi(k) and the
value vj(k) as
dij (xi(k − 1), vj(k − 1)) = ‖xi(k − 1)− vj(k − 1)‖2 (2.7)
dij (xi(k − 1), vj(k − 1)) measures the degree of disagreement of node j from node i
at time k − 1. We measure the degree of cooperation by ∆ij(k) defined as:
∆ij(k) = dij (xi(k − 1), vj(k − 1))− dij (xi(k − 1), vj(k)) (2.8)
∆ij(k) measures the degree of cooperation in the sense that if node j cooperates
(normal), its state is expected to be closer to the state of node i as the iteration
goes on and that if node j does not cooperate (Byzantine), it may sends value vj(k)
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that are far away from xi(k − 1). The decision rule therefore can be specified as:
Iij(k) =

1 if ∆ij(k) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(2.9)
2.3.1.3 Consistency-based Decision Rule
For node i, to verify the correctness of message vj(k), it needs more information
than vj(k). We propose to augment the message sent from node j as follows. Several
new notations will be introduced. The inner message of node j at time instant k
is defined as the messages that node j collects from its neighbors and we denote it
as X∗j (k) = {x∗jl(k− 1), l ∈ N+j } with x∗jj(k− 1) = xcj(k− 1), the calculated state of
node j at super-step k−1. The caculated state is defined in Table 2.1. Similarly, we
define the outer message of node j at time instant k to be the messages broadcast
by node j and we denote it as Xj(k) = {xjl(k− 1), l ∈ N+j }, where xjj(k− 1) might
not equal to xcj(k − 1) for malicious nodes. For normal nodes, the inner message
and the outer message are equal, i.e. Xj(k) = X
∗
j (k). However, for malicious
nodes, they can choose to broadcast messages different from the inner message, i.e.
Xj(k) 6= X∗j (k). The local decision node i makes about node j is not a scalar value.
Instead, it consists of a set of values I lij(k),∀l ∈ N+j , where I lij(k) is node i’s local
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decision about node j’s message xjl(k − 1). Therefore the decision rule becomes
I lij(k) =

1, x∗il(k − 1) = xjl(k − 1), l ∈ Ni
0, x∗il(k − 1) 6= xjl(k − 1), l ∈ Ni
0.5, l /∈ Ni
(2.10)
where x∗il(k − 1) denotes the inner message element acquired by node i about l’s
state if node l can be heard by node i. When l /∈ Ni, the local evidence available
to node i is not sufficient to reach any decision. Therefore I lij(k) = 0.5. We need
to specify a function that maps from these atomic decisions I lij(k) to a single scalar





Since I lij(k) ∈ [0, 1], it can be interpreted as the probability of node j behaving
maliciously regarding xjl. The mapping in equation (2.11) indicates that Iij is closer
to 1 only if all I lij(k)
′s are closer to 1 and that Iij is closer to 0 if any I
l
ij(k) is closer
to 0. The aggregated decision toward node j at super step k, Iij(k), is then used to
update node i’s local trust value toward node j, cij, according to equation (2.3).
2.3.2 Global trust evaluation
We utilize trust propagation in order to get global trust decisions for both the
case of single-dimension decision rules such as clustering-based and distance-based
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decision rules and multi-dimensional decision rules like consistency-based decision
rule.
We first discuss the case of trust propagation for single-dimension decision
rules. Node i maintains its local trust opinion cij(k) about node j for j ∈ Ni and
the local trust decisions Iij(k)’s calculated using various decision rules mentioned
above. However, when node i wants to get a more accurate evaluation of Iij(k), it
needs to rely on the observations of other nodes in the network, i.e. node i needs
to aggregate local trust decisions Ilj(k), l ∈ Ni, l 6= j through trust propagation (we
use global trust evaluation and trust propagation interchangably from now on).
Denote the global trust of node j in the perspective of node i as tij. [26] suggests
to aggregate local trust values by weighing node i’s neighbors’ local trust opinions
about node j. Before the consensus algorithm advance to the next iteration, we
want to obtain the equilibrium global trust opinion through the trust propagation
subroutine, which is also an iterative process. Therefore, we assume cij,∀i, j remain
constant during the iterations to obtain global trust and use τ to denote the iteration
number of global trust values. It is a smaller time scale compared to consensus
iteration number k. Omitting the time instant k for convenience, we have
tτij =







lj if i 6= j
(2.12)
where the normalizing constant is zi =
∑
l∈Ni,l 6=j cil.
Note that in a distributed environment, only cil, l ∈ Ni are stored locally at
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node i while tlj is sent by node i’s neighbor l. However, node l might be malicious
and lying about tlj. Specifically, if node j is normal, node l intentionally reports to
node i that tlj = 0. Similarly, if node j is Byzantine, node l protects its peer by
reporting tlj = 1. To cope with this concern, we introduce a set of pre-trusted nodes
in the network, called headers.
Definition 2.3.1. Headers are a set of pretrusted nodes besides V . They are
equipped with more security measures and therefore are more reliable. The header’s
identity remains anonymous, i.e. neither a normal node in V nor an adversary
knows if a given node is header or not. Therefore, a normal node can choose to
trust or distrust a header since it does not know which node is a header.
The introduction of anonymous headers induces costs since they come with
higher level of reliability. Therefore we might prefer to deploy headers in denser
areas instead of sparse areas in order to make the most use of them. The problem of
how to deploy headers optimally with fixed number of headers is beyond the scope
of this dissertation.
Denote the trust that node i places on a header h as pih. Node i aggregates
local trust from both its neighbors in Ni and headers that it can receive messages
from. The global trust vector ~ti evolves according to:
tτij =











if i 6= j
(2.13)
where H is the set of headers, bH =
∑
h∈H pih, zi =
∑
m∈Ni,m 6=j cil, and zi + bH as
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a whole serves as normalizing constant. Since node i does not know which node is
a header, pih might be smaller than 1. When node i can not obtain messages from
header h, pih = 0. In both cases (with and without trust propagation), the initial
value of global trust t0ij takes the following form:
t0ij =

Iij if node i is normal
1 if both node i and j are malicious
0 if node i is malicious and node j is normal
(2.14)
The local trust decisions in equation (2.14) are propagated via subroutine equa-
tion (2.12) or equation (2.13) with the help of headers. The global trust decision
GIij is obtained by:
GIij =

1 if tij > η
0 if otherwise
(2.15)
where tij is the equilibrium global trust value when equation (2.13) converges and
the real positive η is the threshold used to calculate the global trust decision. Larger
value of η indicates that we are more likely to detect malicious nodes but at the
same time we tend to make more false alarms. Then GIij is used to update trust
values in equation (2.4).
Next we discuss the case of multi-dimensional decision rules. We get the global
trust value tij,l(k) for each dimension of the local trust decision I
l
ij(k) via the same
trust propagation process described for the single-dimension case. The global trust
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decision GI lij for dimension l is obtained by:
GI lij =

1 if tij,l > η
0 if otherwise
(2.16)
where tij,l is the global trust value at equilibrium for dimension l. The global trust





The introduction of trust propagation (global trust evaluation) in the trust
model can incur high computational cost since it is an embedded iterative process.
Therefore, we can choose to either activate this part or mute it wisely in practice.
In this chapter, we give simulation results for both cases and leave the discussion of
when to activate trust propagation and when to mute it as future work.
2.4 Trust-aware consensus algorithms
Given the trust model above, we obtain either the local or global trust de-
cision fij(k) which will then be used to update the trust value cij(k) according to
equation (2.4). We are now in the position to propose our trust-aware consensus










j∈Ni cij(k) and vj(k − 1) is the message sent by node j. If j is
malicious, vj(k−1) is not necessarily xj(k−1). Using cij(k) as the linear coefficient
to combine message vj(k − 1) is just one way to do it. The local trust value cij(k)
incorporates both the trust value history of node j in the local view of node i and the
trust decisions made by other nodes in the network. There are other more complex
choices.
Note that the trust model as well as the decision rules defined in the previous
section become pluggable components to the trust-aware consensus algorithm be-
cause it only needs as input the trust dynamics given states, ignoring the details of
the trust model design and decision rules. This makes the algorithm highly exten-
sible to future developments of more complicated trust models and decision rules.
The full algorithm consisting of the trust-aware consensus algorithm and the trust
model based on cluster-based decision rule or distance-based decision rule is shown
in Algorithm 1.
The trust-aware consensus algorithm with consistency-based decision rule based
on augmented messages is shown in Algorithm 2. In practice, an ensemble of the
various choices of decision rules will be used. Note that the actions within the for
loops in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are executed in parallel instead of in a sequen-
tial way. Our trust-aware consensus algorithm is not restricted to the three decision
rules in Section 2.3. We can readily place more delicate decision rules into the al-
gorithm. Moreover, the model can incorporate more complex update schemes for
trust compared to equation (2.4). Therefore, the trust-aware consensus algorithm
is highly extensible. Table 2.1 shows the common notations used in this chapter.
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2.5 Theoretical analysis on security guarantees
The trust propagation with the help of headers improves the accuracy of trust
evaluation since trust evidence of multiple nodes in the network are utilized for the
calculation of trust values in a distributed way. In what follows, we discuss how the
connectivity of the graph and the number of headers affect the accuracy of trust
evaluation within a specific iteration k.
The trust graph might be time varying and the edge weights cij may be hetero-
geneous, making the equilibrium decision values computationally difficult. There-
fore, we will focus on special cases when the trust graph is regular and give some
qualitative analysis on the cases when the trust graph is not regular. Therefore
we assume that the trust graph is regular, i.e. the weights are the same across all
edges, for the purpose of quantitative analysis. We use |Nh,j| to denote the number
of headers that have direct evidence of node j and can evaluate j’s trust with high
accuracy and |Nm| as the total number of adversaries in the network who collabo-
rate to revert the trust evaluation in the propagation process. Specifically, all the
adversaries will vote −1 for the target node at all times if it is honest and vote 1 if it
is malicious. We assume that adversaries do not have power constraints so that they
can reach the whole network to participate in every propagation process in order to
maximize their damage.
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2.5.1 Single-dimension decision rules
We analyse security guarantees of decision rules based on scalar-valued mes-
sages vj(k)’s. Examples of such decision rules are previously-discussed clustering-
based and distance-based decision rules. As in equation (2.13), we denote the trust
opinion about node j by header h as chj ∈ {0, 1} where chj = 0 means the header h
considers node j to be malicious and evaluates its trust to be 0 and chj = 1 means
the header considers the node to be normal. We also denote the true type of node j
as uj ∈ {0, 1}. Headers, with their high security measures, can also make mistakes
in evaluating chj. Therefore we express the probability of making a wrong decision
of by header h as:
p (chj = uj) = 1− ε (2.19)
where uj is the true type of node j and ε is the probability of a header making a
wrong trust decision. We assume in the above equation that the error probability
is the same for all headers for simplicity. The problem of detecting whether node
j is malicious or not by node i is reduced to a hypothesis problem specified in
equation (2.15). In what follows, we derive the probability distribution of tij and
give analytical results on miss detection rate under the assumption of regular trust
graph.
Theorem 2.5.1. For a regular trust graph, the miss detection rate and the false
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alarm rate are




x (1− ε)|Nhj |−x




x (1− ε)|Nhj |−x
(2.20)
where GIij is the node i’s global trust decision about node j after trust propagation,
uj is the hidden true type of node j, C
x
|Nhj | is the number of x-combinations from a
set of |Nhj| distinct nodes and
yhj = dη|Nhj| − (1− η) (|Nm| − 1)e
zhj = bη (|Nhj|+ |Nm|)c
(2.21)
Proof. The absorption probability 1 is the same for every pair of nodes consisting





chj + q(|Nm| − 1) (2.22)




|Nhj|+ |Nm| − 1
(2.23)
And chj is the header h’s trust value on node j. Headers h ∈ Nh,j estimates target
1Absorption probability: in a Markov chain, the probability of being absorbed in one of the
absorbing states when starting from a transient state
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j’s type correctly with 1− ε. We have:





chj + |Nm| − 1















− |Nm|+ 1 | uj = 0
)
= p (x > η (|Nm|+ |Nhj| − 1)− |Nm|+ 1 | uj = 0)





x (1− ε)|Nhj |−x
(2.24)











Then the false alarm rate can be derived as follows:








= p (x < η (|Nm|+ |Nhj|) | uj = 0)










x (1− ε)|Nhj |−x
(2.27)
Corollary 2.5.1.1. For a regular trust graph, the single-dimensional decision rule
in equation (2.15) should satisfy the following:
|Nhj|2 > |Nm|(|Nm| − 1)
|Nm| − 1





Otherwise, the miss detection rate and the false alarm rate will both deteriorate to
1.0.
Proof. For the miss detection rate to take a value strictly less than 1, we need to
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have yhj > 0 which is equivalent to:
η|Nhj| − (1− η)(|Nm| − 1) > 0⇔
η >
|Nm| − 1
|Nhj|+ |Nm| − 1
(2.29)
Similarly, for the false alarm rate to take a value strictly less than 1, we need to
have zhj < |Nhj| which is equivalent to:





Combining equation (2.29) and equation (2.30), we get:
|Nm| − 1




Letting |Nm|−1|Nhj |+|Nm|−1 <
|Nhj |
|Nhj |+|Nm|
, we get the first inequality in equation (2.28).
Fig. 2.1(a) shows that with increasing number of headers, the miss detection
rate decreases. When the number of headers is six and the number of adversaries
is more than three, increasing the number of headers further will not bring much
gain however. This is practically beneficial because by deploying a small number of
expensive headers, we already have low enough miss detection rate (lower than 0.05
as shown in the figure). Also, when the number of adversaries increases, we need
more headers for the same miss detection rate. Next we examine the false alarm
rate in Fig. 2.1(b). We observe that for the same number headers and adversaries,
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(a) the decision threshold is η = 0.5, the proba-
bility of making a wrong decision by a header is
ε = 0.05.




















(b) η = 0.5, ε = 0.05.
Figure 2.1: The adversary takes random vibration strategy.
the false alarm rate is always worse than the miss detection. This is because when
evaluating the trust of a normal node, one more adversaries participate in the trust
propagation than when evaluating a malicious node. The figures in Fig. 2.1 serve as
a guidance on how many headers we need to deploy given targeted miss detection
rate and false alarm rate.
2.5.2 Multi-dimensional decision rules
We analyse the security guarantee of multi-dimensional decision rules. Exam-
ple rules are consistency-based decision rule. At each iteration k, node i needs to
give trust decision on node j’s true type zj. We have the following theorem regarding
the miss detection rate and the false alarm rate:
Theorem 2.5.2. For a regular trust graph, the miss detection rate and the false
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alarm rate of multi-dimensional decision rules are:















where |Nhjl| is the number of headers that have direct evidence of node j’s l-th
dimension message and can evaluate node j’s trust regarding dimension l. And we
have:
yhjl = dη|Nhjl| − (1− η) (|Nm| − 1)e
zhjl = bη (|Nhjl|+ |Nm|)c
(2.32)
Proof. We have:













The first equality holds because different dimensions of augmented messages are
evaluated independently. The same derivation process applies to the false alarm
rate.
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2.5.3 Security performance for general trust graphs
The previous discussions assume that the trust graph is regular which makes
the absorption probability uniform across all headers. This makes the decision rules
equivalent to majority vote with uniform weights. In a general trust graph however,
the absorption probability qik should be different for different source node i and






qik = 1 (2.34)
where qih is the absorption probability from source node i to a header node h and
qik is the absorption probability from source node i to a malicious node k.
Theorem 2.5.3. For a general trust graph, the miss detection rate for evaluating
whether target node j is malicious by source node i to is upper bounded by:

























where η is the decision threshold used in equation (2.15), ε is the probability of
making a mistake by a header in evaluating target node j.
Proof. When the target node j’s true type is uj = 0, malicious nodes in Nm − {j}










According to the Hoeffding-Azuma concentration bound in [28], we have:



























































Similarly, when the target node j’s true type is uj = 1, malicious nodes in Nm collude



















qih E chj ≤ η −
∑
h∈Nhj
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h∈Nhj











qihchj ≥ (1− ε)
∑
h∈Nhj














To get an intuitive idea of how the error rates vary in equation (2.35) with
respect to different absorption probabilities corresponding to different trust graphs,
we derive the miss detection rates under some assumptions about the trust graph.
We omit the discussion of false alarm rates because the derivation is similar to that
of the miss detection rates.
Corollary 2.5.3.1. If in the ideal case the absorption probabilities from source node
i to any malicious node k ∈ Nm satisfy qik = 0 and that qih = qih′ ,∀h, h′ ∈ Nhj,
then the miss detection rate is upper bounded by:
p(GIij = 1|uj = 0) ≤ exp
(




Proof. If qik = 0,∀k ∈ Nm, we have
∑
h∈Nhj qih = 1. Plugging this into the first
equation in equation (2.35):
p(GIij = 1|uj = 0) ≤ exp
(
















−2|Nhj| (η − ε)2
)
(2.41)






Corollary (2.5.3.1) gives us a straightforward conclusion that the upper bound
of the miss detection rate decreases exponentially with respect to the increase of the
number of headers |Nhj|. We generalize corollary (2.5.3.1) by the following corollary:
Corollary 2.5.3.2. If the absorption probabilities from source node i to any mali-
cious node k ∈ Nm satisfies
∑
k∈Nm qik ≤ σ where σ is a positive real number such
that σ < η−ε
1−ε and that qih = qih′ , ∀h, h
′ ∈ Nhj, then the upper bound of the miss
detection rate becomes:










k∈Nm qik ≤ σ, we have
∑
h∈Nhj qih ≥ 1 − σ. Plugging this into the first
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equation in equation (2.35):






















































By plugging in the inequality
∑
h∈Nhj qih ≥ 1 − σ, we obtain the upper bound in
corollary (2.5.3.2).
From the above corollary, we not only know that the miss detection rate de-
creases exponentially as the number of headers increases, but also observe that when
σ decreases, the miss detection rate also decreases. This result is very intuitive in
that lower absorption probabilities on malicious nodes results in lower miss detection
rate.
2.6 Case study and performance evaluation
We consider a sensor network with 7 nodes (sensors) shown in Fig. 2.7. The
shaded node is a Byzantine adversary and all the other nodes are normal nodes. In
the simulation, each normal node uses both cluster-based decision rule and distance-
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(a) No trust propagation and no adversaries.


















(b) No adversary. Use trust propagation.
Figure 2.2: Trust-aware consensus algorithm in situations with or without trust
propagation when there are no adversaries in the network.
based decision rule to generate local decisions. The consistency-based decision rule
is evaluated theorectically in [25]. We assume the probability of choosing either
one is set to 0.5. In practice, each node (sensor) can have its own parameters for
the probabilities of randomly choosing decision rules. For simulation purposes, we
consider the following 4 malicious strategies adopted by the Byzantine adversary:
1. Remain constant : the adversary, disregarding the update rule in equation (2.18),
holds a constant value.
2. Random vibration: the adversary switches between several values randomly at
each iteration.
3. Random noise: the adversary adds a random noise to the state calculted if it
is a normal node.
4. Fixed noise: the adversary adds a fixed input to the state calculated if it is a
normal node.
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(a) Node 7 is adversary. No
trust and adversary adopts re-
main constant strategy.


















(b) Node 7 is adversary. No
trust propagation and adver-
sary adopts remain constant
strategy.


















(c) Node 7 is adversary. Use
trust propagation. Adversary
adopts remain constant strat-
egy.
Figure 2.3: The adversary takes constant strategy.


















(a) Node7 is adversary. No
trust and adversary adopts
random vibration strategy.


















(b) Node7 is adversary. No
trust propagation and adver-
sary adopts random vibration
strategy.


















(c) Node 7 is adversary. Use
trust propagation. Adversary
adopts random vibration strat-
egy.
Figure 2.4: The adversary takes randome vibration strategy.


















(a) Node 7 is adversary. No
trust. Adversary adopts ran-
dom noise strategy.


















(b) Node 7 is adversary. No
trust propagation. Adversary
adopts random noise strategy.


















(c) Node 7 is adversary. Use
trust propagation. Adversary
adopts random noise strategy.
Figure 2.5: The adversary takes random noise strategy.
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(a) Node 7 is adversary. No
trust. Adversary adopts fixed
noise strategy.


















(b) Node 7 is adversary. No
trust propagation. Adversary
adopts fixed noise strategy.


















(c) Node 7 is adversary. Use
trust propagation. Adversary
adopts fixed noise strategy.
Figure 2.6: The adversary takes fixed noise strategy.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 2.2, Fig. 2.3, Fig. 2.4, Fig. 2.5, and-
Fig. 2.6. First look at Fig. 2.2(a) and Fig. 2.2(b). When no adversaries exist, the
use of global trust (trust propagation) can speed up convergence. When node 7 is
set to be adversary and it adopts remain constant strategy, all nodes can still reach
convergence as shown in Fig. 2.3(b). However, all nodes are dragged to closer to the
constant input of node 7 because local evidence of nodes are not sufficient to reach
good decision at the beginning of the consensus iterations and it takes a period of
time before all other nodes can detect the adversary and exclude it from consensus
updates. This problem is mitigated when we invoke global trust and take advan-
tage of trust decisions made by other nodes in the network as shown in Fig. 2.3(c).
Nodes can detect an adversary much faster than in Fig. 2.3(b) and all normal nodes
remain relatively unaffected by node 7. The effects of earlier detection also happens
for use of trust propagation when the adversary adopts random vibration strategy
as in Fig. 2.4(b) and Fig. 2.4(c). Detection of an adversary with random noise and
fixed noise is similar. Local evidences are still sufficient to detect this malicious









Good	  Node	   Malicious	  Node	  
Figure 2.7: Sensor network of 7 nodes (sensors) with the centering shaded node as
Byzantine adversary.
are detected at an earlier stage as shown in Fig. 2.5(c) and Fig. 2.6(c).
Next we present the performance of trust-aware consensus algorithm in an
even sparser sensor network shown in Fig. 2.8. The communication graph contains
seven nodes numbering from 1 to 7 plus a triangle node. The triangle node is a
header node and the links connecting the header node and others are not part of the
communication graph. However, the dotted links are in the trust graph. Therefore
network connectivity of the communication graph in this example network is 2,
rendering connectivity-based approaches in most of previous works invalid because
connectivity < 2f +1. The header node does not participate in consensus iterations
but is involved in the global trust evaluation process in equation (2.13). The dotted
lines indicate that node 5 and node 6 can obtain trust decisions from header. We
assume header node can provide trust decisions about node 1 and 4 and since header









Good Node Malicious Node Header 
Figure 2.8: Network of 8 nodes (sensors) with the centering shaded node as Byzan-
tine adversary and triangle node as header. The dotted links incident on the header
node are not in the communication graph. Instead, they belong to the trust graph.
Nodes 1 to 7 form a communication graph of connectivity 2.
headers. Therefore we set the local trust value from node 5 and 6 toward header to
be 0.5. The results are shown in Fig. 2.9, Fig. 2.10, Fig. 2.11, and Fig. 2.12. We
observe that even in this sparse network, normal nodes can still detect node 7 and
reach consensus eventually under each of the adversary strategies.
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(a) Adversary takes constant strategy. No Trust.


















(b) Adversary takes constant strategy.
Figure 2.9: Trust-aware consensus algorithm in sparse network Fig. 2.8 of connec-
tivity 2.. Constant strategy.


















(a) Adversary takes random vibration strategy.
No trust.


















(b) Adversary takes random vibration strategy.
Figure 2.10: Trust-aware consensus algorithm in sparse network Fig. 2.8 of connec-
tivity 2.. Random vibration.
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(a) Adversary takes random noise strategy. No
trust.


















(b) Adversary takes random noise strategy.
Figure 2.11: Trust-aware consensus algorithm in sparse network Fig. 2.8 of connec-
tivity 2.. Random noise.


















(a) Adversary takes fixed noise strategy. No trust.


















(b) Adversary takes fixed noise strategy.
Figure 2.12: Trust-aware consensus algorithm in sparse network Fig. 2.8 of connec-
tivity 2.. Fixed noise.
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Algorithm 1: Trust-Aware Consensus Algorithm
Input: initial states xi(0),∀i ∈ V and initial local trust
cij(0),∀i ∈ V \ F , ∀j ∈ V ∪H, η
Receive messages from neighbors
// Calculate local trust decisions Iij(k + 1)
for ∀i ∈ V \ F do
for ∀j ∈ Ni do
calculate Iij(k + 1)
end
end
// Trust decision propagation
repeat
for ∀i ∈ V \ F do
for ∀j ∈ Ni do
// The local trust values cij(k) remain constant within
trust iterations.
update tτij(k) according to equation (2.13)
end
end
until |tτij(k)− tτ−1ij (k)| < ε;
Calculate global trust decisions GIij(k + 1) using equation (2.15)
// Update trust values cij
for ∀i ∈ V \ F do
for ∀j ∈ Ni do
rij(k + 1) = ρ1rij(k) +GIij(k + 1)
sij(k + 1) = ρ2sij(k) + 1−GIij(k + 1)
cij(k) = E [pij(k)] = rij(k)+1rij(k)+sij(k)+2
end
end
Update state xi based on updated cij according to equation (2.18)
Repeat until convergence
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Algorithm 2: Trust-Aware Consensus Algorithm Based on Consistency
Input: initial states xi(0),∀i ∈ V and initial local trust
cij(0),∀i ∈ V \ F , ∀j ∈ V ∪H, η
Receive augmented message vectors from neighbors
for ∀i ∈ V \ F do
for ∀j ∈ Ni do
compute I lij(k + 1) according to equation (2.10)
end
end
// Trust decision propagation
repeat
for ∀i ∈ V \ F do
for ∀j ∈ Ni do
for ∀l ∈ N+j do
// The local trust values cij(k) remain constant
within trust iterations.




until |tτij,l(k)− tτ−1ij,l (k)| < ε;
Calculate global trust decisions GIij,l(k + 1) using equation (2.16)
Calculate global trust decisions GIij(k + 1) =
∏
l∈N+j
GIij,l(k + 1) using
equation (2.17)
// Update trust values cij
for ∀i ∈ V \ F do
for ∀j ∈ Ni do
rij(k + 1) = ρ1rij(k) +GIij(k + 1)
sij(k + 1) = ρ2sij(k) + 1−GIij(k + 1)
cij(k) = E [pij(k)] = rij(k)+1rij(k)+sij(k)+2
end
end
Update state xi based on updated cij according to equation (2.18)
Repeat until convergence
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Table 2.1: Commonly Used Notations
Notation Definition
k the time step at the top layer (communication graph)
τ the time step at the bottom layer (trust graph) which is a
smaller time scale compared to k
V set of nodes in the network (nodes are the same in both layers)
xcj (k) the calculated state of node j according to equation (2.18)
xj(0) the initial state of node j
X∗j (k) the messages that node j hears from its neighbors N
+
j (k − 1)
Xj (k) the messages that node j broadcast about what it hears and
what it calculates
fij(k) the trust decision about node j by node i. It takes values from
{0, 1}. It is calculated either from purely local evidence or from
both local and second-hand evidence
Iij(k) the local trust decision about node j by node i
GIij(k) the global trust decision about node j by node i through trust
propagation
tτij(k) the global trust value held by node i toward j at iteration τ for
kth round of consensus algorithm
tij(k) the equilibrium global trust value held by node i toward j at
iteration k for consensus algorithm. It is used to calculate global
trust decision GIij(k)
cij (k) the local trust value node i has about node j at iteration k for
consensus algorithm. Either Iij(k) or GIij(k) is used to update
it. It incorporates both the trust value history of node j and
the trust decisions from other nodes
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Chapter 3: Worker Trust In Crowdsourcing With Adversaries
3.1 Enhancing data fusion using multi-dimensional trust
3.1.1 Motivation
In a crowdsourcing task, in order to estimate the true labels of questions, each
question is distributed to the open crowd and is answered by a subset of workers.
The answers from workers are then aggregated, taking into account the reliability
of workers, to produce final estimates of true labels. Example questions are image
label inference with multiple annotators’ input, topic-document pair relevance infer-
ence with crowd’s judgements, Bayesian network structure learning given experts’
partial knowledge, and test grading without knowing answers. Most past research
ignores the multi-domain property present in the questions above. For example
in test grading without golden truth, bio-chemistry questions require knowledge in
both biology and chemistry. Some are more related to biology while others are more
related to chemistry. Similarly, workers also exhibit such multi-domain character-
istics: people are good at different subjects. The above observations motivate our
modeling of multi-domain characteristics for both questions and trust in workers’
knowledge and the design of principled methods for aggregating knowledge input
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from various unreliable sources with different expertise in each domain.
In this problem, we propose to model each question by a concept vector, which
is a real random vector where the value in a particular dimension indicates its asso-
ciation in that dimension [29]. Back to the test grading example, each bio-chemistry
question is represented by a two-dimensional hidden concept vector with the first
dimension being chemistry and the second dimension being biology. So a concept
vector [0.7, 0.3] means the question is more associated with chemistry. Note that
the concept vector can be far more general than this. In the case of identifying
causal relationships between entities, reasoning ability and past experience are two
dimensions of the concept vector. Each worker is modeled also by a trust vector,
which is a real random vector with each dimension representing the trustworthiness
of the worker in that dimension. The multi-domain property of questions and work-
ers for the biology-chemistry example is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Our goal is to better
estimate the true labels of question Q by fusing answers from multiple unreliable
workers with varying trust values in each of the domains. Note that the concept
vectors of questions and the trust vectors of workers are both hidden. We therefore
propose a probabilistic model that incorporates questions’ concept vectors, workers’
trust vectors, answers submitted by workers and design an inference algorithm that
jointly estimates the true label of questions along with concept vectors and trust
vectors. The inference algorithm is based on a variational approximation of poste-
rior distributions using a factorial distribution family. In addition, we extend the
model by incorporating continuously-valued features. In applications where each




worker [0.95, 0.95] 
worker 
worker [0.95, 0.5] 
[0.5, 0.95] 
worker [0.5, 0.5] 
0.7 
0.3 Biology 
Figure 3.1: Multi-domain property of questions and workers in the test grading
example. Q represents a question with concept vector [0.7, 0.3] shown on the edges.
Several workers with different two-dimensional trust vectors provide answers.
vector corresponds to a topic. Therefore we further propose an extended model that
integrates topic discovery.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We formulate a probabilistic model of crowdsourcing tasks with multi-domain
characteristics and propose a novel inference method based on variational in-
ference.
• Our model is very flexible and can be easily extended. In applications where
each question comes with a feature vector, we further develop an extended
model that handles questions with continuously-valued features.
• We further extend the model by combining a multi-domain crowdsourcing
model with topic discovery based on questions’ text descriptions and derive
an analytical solution to the collective variational inference.
3.1.2 Related work
There are a lot of works on how to leverage trust models to better aggre-
gate information from multiple sources. Conflicts between information provided by
49
different sources were used to revise trust in the information [30]. Trust was also
used as weights of edges in the sensor network and was integrated into distributed
Kalman filtering to more accurately estimate the state of a linear dynamical sys-
tem in a distributed setting [20]. Local evidence was leveraged to establish local
trust bewteen agents in a network and those local trusts were then used to isolate
untrustworthy agents during sensor fusion [23].
In the context of crowdsourcing tasks to the open crowd, many works develop
models for aggregating unreliable input from multiple sources to more accurately
estimate true labels of questions. [31] combined multiple weak workers’ input for
constructing a Bayesian network structure assuming each worker is equally trust-
worthy. Workers’ trust was considered to improve accuracy in aggregating answers
in [32–35].
A model that jointly infers label of image, trust of each labeler and difficulty of
image is proposed in [36]. However, they model questions and workers using scalar
variables and they use the Expectation-Maximization inference algorithm, which has
long been known to suffer from many local optima difficulties. Another work that
went a step further based on signal detection theory is [37], where they assume each
question comes with a feature set and models each worker by a multidimensional
classifier in an abstract feature space. Our model can handle more general cases
without such an assumption and when text information is available for each question,
each dimension of a question becomes interpretable. Moreover, it is difficult to
find analytical solutions to posterior distributions of hidden variables in [37]. An
approach in the spirit of test theory and item-response theory (IRT) was proposed
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in [38] and they relied on approximate message-passing for inference. Their model
is not as flexible and extensivle as our model because they have to redesign their
model to incorporate rich metadata associated with each question.
3.1.3 Definitions
We assume there are M workers available and N questions whose true labels
need to be estimated. We use Ri to denote the true label variable of question i,
where Ri ∈ {0, 1}. Each question is answered by a subset of workers Mi and we
denote the answer of question i given by worker j by lij ∈ {0, 1}. The set of questions
answered by worker j is denoted by Nj.
The multi-domain characteristics of question i are represented by a concept
vector λi, a D-dimensional real-valued random vector, where D is the total number
of domains. To simulate a probability distribution, we further require λil ∈ [0, 1], l =
1, . . . , D and
∑D
l=1 λil = 1, where λil denotes the lth dimension of the concept vector.
We impose a Dirichlet prior distribution for concept vector λi with hyperparameter
α = {αl}Dl=1, where αl denotes the soft counts that specify which domain a question
falls into a priori.
Workers contribute to the estimation of the true label of questions by providing
their own guesses. However, workers’ inputs may not be reliable and sometimes even
malicious. In multi-domain crowdsourcing tasks, different workers may be good at
different domains. The multi-dimensional characteristics of a worker is described
by a D-dimensional trust vector βj = {βj1, . . . , βjl, . . . , βjD}, where βjl denotes j-th
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worker’s trust value in domain l and it takes either a continuous or a discrete value.
In the discrete case, the inference is generally NP-hard and message-passing style
algorithms are used. We consider the continuous case only where βj ∈ [0, 1]D,∀j.
Higher value of βjl indicates that worker j is more trustworthy in domain l. The
true value of βjl is usually unknown to the crowdsourcing platform. It has to be
estimated from answers provided by workers. We assume a Beta prior distribution
for βil with hyper-parameter θ = {θ0, θ1}, where θ0 > 0 is the soft count for worker
j to behave maliciously and θ1 > 0 is the soft count for worker j to behave reliably.
This interpretation resembles the Beta reputation system [24] that models beliefs of
workers.
We aim to estimate the true labels of questions and trust vectors of workers
from answers provided by workers.
3.1.4 Multi-domain crowdsourcing model
We describe the generating process for the Multi-Domain Crowdsourcing (mdc)
Model in this section.
1. For each question i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(a) draw the domain distribution λi|α ∼ Dir(α);
(b) draw domain Ci|λi ∼ Discrete(λi);
2. For each question i, draw the true label Ri ∼ Uniform(0, 1);
3. For each worker j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and domain l ∈ {1, . . . , D}, draw the trust
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value βjl ∼ Beta(θ);
4. For each question-worker pair (i, j), draw observed answer lij ∼ F (Ri, βj, Ci)
In step 1, the domain for question i is then drawn according to a discrete distribution
with parameter λi, i.e. generating Ci = l with probability λil. In step 3, we profile
each worker by a vector βj with βjl drawn from a Beta distribution. In step 4, the
observed answer of question i provided by worker j is drawn according to an output
distribution F, a Bernoulli distribution. We will specify the form of this output
distribution in the following paragraph.
The generating process is illustrated in Fig. 3.2. The joint probability distri-
bution is
p (L,R, β, C, λ) =
N∏
i=1






p (lij|ri, Ci = l, βj)
(3.1)
where N is the total number of questions, M is the total workers, and D is the
total number of domains. p (lij|ri, Ci = l, βj) is the output distribution F in Fig. 3.2
and is the likelihood of worker j′s answer given its expertise vector and the domain
variable of question i, and the true label. p (ri), and p (βj) are prior distributions.
F can be compactly expressed as:




where 1{lij = ri} is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the observed label






Figure 3.2: The graphical model for observed data provided by workers L, multi-
domain expertise β, true labels R, domain variables C, and concept vectors λ. M is
the total number of workers. N the number of questions. α is the hyperparameter
of the Dirichlet prior distribution for λ and θ is the hyperparameter of the Beta
prior distribution for β.




In order to estimate the questions’ true labels ri, i = 1, . . . , N and workers’
trust vectors βj, j = 1, . . . ,M , their posterior distributions need to be computed.
However, the computation of posterior distributions involves integrating out a large
number of variables, making the computation intractable. We propose to use a
variational approximation of the posterior distribution of variables in equation (3.1)
with a factorized distribution family:

















The optimal forms of these factors are obtained by maximizing the following lower
bound of the log likelihood of observed labels ln p(L):
ln p(L) ≥ E
q
ln p (L,R, β, C, λ)− E
q
ln q (R, β, C, λ) (3.4)
We show inference details in Algorithm (3). Updates for each factor are derived
in the Appendix. Upon convergence of Algorithm (3), we obtain the approximate
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posterior distributions of the questions’ true labels {ri}′s and of the workers’ trust
vectors {βj}’s.
Algorithm 3: Multi-Domain Crowdsourcing
Input: initial values of hyperparameters α, θ
Output: approximate posterior q (R, β, C, λ)
Do the following updates repeatedly until convergence.







where θ̃jl0 = θjl0 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri 6= lij) and
θ̃jl1 = θjl1 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri = lij).
2) Then update q(ri), ∀i = 1, . . . , N, sequentially, in the following way:












ψ(θ̃jl0)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
)]
(3.6)
where ψ(·) is digamma function. Then normalize q(ri), ri ∈ {0, 1} to make
them valid probabilities.






where Dir(·) is Dirichlet distribution and α̃il = αl + q(Ci = l).
4) Then update q(Ci = l):












ψ(θ̃jl1)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
)
+ q(ri 6= lij)
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Figure 3.3: The graphical model for observed data provided by workers L, features
x, multi-domain expertise β, true labels R, domain variables C, and parameter for
domain distribution λ. µ, Σ, w, and δ are model parameters.
3.1.5 Integration with features
Algorithm (3) ignores features of questions. In most cases we do have features
associated with questions. These features help us better estimate both the questions’
true labels and the workers’ trust vectors. Our proposed model mdc can be easily
extended to incorporate question features. The extended graphical model is shown
in Fig. 3.3, where x denotes the features observed. We call this extended model
mdfc. Intuitively, the features associated with questions allow us to better estimate
the questions’ concept vectors and the workers’ trust vectors so that true labels of
questions can be more accurately inferred.
Let’s assume question i’s feature vector xi is a K-dimensional real-valued vec-
tor. The likelihood of feature xi, given domain variable Ci, is modeled by a multi-
variate Gaussian distribution with µl’ as the K-dimensional mean vector of the l-th
domain and Σl as the K ×K covariance matrix:
ln p(xi|Ci = l) ∝ −
1
2





where |Σl| denotes the determinant of the covariance matrix of the l-th domain. The
conditional distribution of the true label variable Ri, given feature variable xi, can
take various forms. We use the logistic regression model:







where w is the regression coefficient and δ is the intercept for the regression model.
The inference and parameter estimation of mdfc differs from Algorithm (3) in
three ways: first, the update of q(Ci) includes an extra term ln p(xi|Ci = l); second,
the update of q(ri) includes an additional term p(ri|xi); third, there is an additional
M-step to estimate model parameters µl’s, Σl’s, w, and δ given current approximate
posteriors. The details of variational inference and model parameter estimation of
mdfc is similar to that of mdtc and are shown in the Appendix.
3.1.6 Multi-domain crowdsourcing model with topic model
In many crowdsourcing applications, we can often get access to questions’ text
descriptions. Given the text description, we can use the latent Dirichlet allocation
to extract topic distribution of a question [39]. The advantage of topic models over
the Gaussian mixture model in Section 3.1.5 is that the domains (topics) are of low
dimensions and are easier to interpret. For example, using topic models, a question
might be assigned to the domain of sports while another question assgined to music
domain. For a crowdsourcing platform, it needs to profile a worker’s trust in all
these interpretable topics instead of some latent unexplainable domain. We call this
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Algorithm 4: Multi-Domain Crowdsourcing With Features
Input: initial values of hyperparameters α, θ
Output: approximate posterior q (R, β, C, λ)
E-step and M-step are repeated until convergence
E-step: Given current estimation of model parameters µl’s, Σl’s, w, and δ:
Do the following updates repeatedly until convergence.







where θ̃jl0 = θjl0 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri 6= lij) and
θ̃jl1 = θjl1 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri = lij).
2) Then update q(ri), ∀i = 1, . . . , N, sequentially, in the following way:























where ψ(·) is digamma function. Then normalize q(ri), ri ∈ {0, 1} to make
them valid probabilities.






where Dir(·) is Dirichlet distribution and α̃il = αl + q(Ci = l).
4) Then update q(Ci = l):












ψ(θ̃jl1)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
)
+ q(ri 6= lij)
(




(xi − µl)T Σ−1l (xi − µl)−
1
2
ln |Σl| (xi − µl)
(3.14)
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Algorithm 4: Multi-Domain Crowdsourcing With Features (Continued)
M-step: Given current approximate posterior distributions, obtain the
estimates of µl’s, Σl’s, w, and δ by maximizing the expectation of the
logarithm of the posterior:
µnewl =
∑N
i=1 q(Ci = l)xi∑N
i=1 q(Ci = l)
Σnewl =
∑
i q(Ci = l) (xi − µnewl ) (xi − µnewl )
T∑N


















Txi + δ)− q(ri = 0)σ(−wTxi − δ)
]






L,R, β, C, λ|{µnewl }Dl=1, {Σnewl }Dl=1, w, δ
)
using L-BFGS quasi-Newton method
(3.15)
extended model with topic discovery mdtc and we will exploit the topic discovery
of questions in the experiments section.
Each topic corresponds to one domain of a question. The learned topic dis-
tribution can then be used as a damping prior for domain variable C. We show
that our mdc is flexible to incorporate topics models and it is an easy extension
to jointly infer topic distribution and the true labels of quesitons and the workers’
trust vectors in equation (3.1).
In addition to obtaining posterior probability distributions for R, β, C, λ, we
can also obtain the posterior distribution for the topic distribution for the k-th word
in the i-th question zik, and the word distribution for l-th topic φl simultaneously.
Denote niw as the number of occurances of word w in question i and ηiwl as the
probability that the word w in question i is associated with domain l. The variational
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α λi Ci
Ri Lij β j
 j = 1,…M
 i = 1,…N
θ
zik wik φl ρ
i,k  l = 1,…D
Figure 3.4: The graphical model for mdtc. L are observed answers from workers,
wik is word k observed in question i, multi-domain expertise β, true labels R, domain
variables C, parameter for domain distribution λ, topic distribution for word k in
question i : zik, word distribution for domain l : φl.
inference process differs from Algorithm (3) in the following ways:





w niwηiwl is the additional term introduced by topic
discovery.
2. The update of q(ziw = l) = ηiwl follows:
ln ηiwl ∝ E
q
ln p(ziw = l|λi) + E
q
lnφlw (3.16)
where φlw = p (wik = w|φ, zik = l) .
3. The φ′ls have a Diricilet posterior distribution with parameter Υ̃l as follows:




where Υ is the hyper-parameter of the Dirichlet prior distribution.
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Algorithm 5: Multi-Domain Crowdsourcing With Topic Model
Input: initial values of hyperparameters α, θ
Output: approximate posterior q (R, β, C, λ)
Do the following updates repeatedly until convergence.







where θ̃jl0 = θjl0 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri 6= lij) and
θ̃jl1 = θjl1 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri = lij).
2) Then update q(ri), ∀i = 1, . . . , N, sequentially, in the following way:












ψ(θ̃jl0)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
)]
(3.19)
where ψ(·) is digamma function. Then normalize q(ri), ri ∈ {0, 1} to make
them valid probabilities.










4) Then update q(Ci = l):












ψ(θ̃jl1)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
)
+ q(ri 6= lij)
(
ψ(θ̃jl0)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
)]
(3.21)






where Υ̃lw = Υ +
∑
i niwηiwl.
6) Then update q(ziw):











For each i, w, normalize {ηiwl}Dl=1 to make them valid probabilities.61
3.1.7 Experiments on real datasets
In this section, we compare our proposed models mdc, mdfc, and mdtc with
crowdsourcing models with single dimensional trust (sdc) and show that our models
have superior performance on both the UCI dataset and scientific text dataset. In
addition, our models can effectively recover the workers’ trust vectors which can
be used to match the right workers to a given task in the future. The models we
consider for comparison are listed as follows:
1. mdc: our proposed multi-domain crowdsourcing model without features.
2. mdfc: extended model of mdc with continuously-valued features.
3. mdtc: another extended model of mdc that combines topic model given text
descriptions associated with questions.
4. mv: the majority vote as the baseline algorithm.
5. sdc: the state-of-the-art in [35]. We call this algorithm sdc because it is
equivalent to mdc when each worker is represented by only a scalar variable
(single domain in our case)
3.1.7.1 UCI datasets
We conducted experiments on the pima dataset from UCI Machine Learn-
ing Repository1 [40]. Each data instance corresponds to a 8-dimensional feature
of an anonymous patient. The dataset consists of 768 data intances and we ask
1http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets.html?sort=nameUp&view=list
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the following question for each instance: should the patient be tested positive for
diabetes. Since there are no worker-provided labels in this dataset, we simulate
workers with varying reliability in different domains. We adopt k-means clustering
to cluster the data into two clusters (domains). Therefore, each worker is profiled
by a two-dimensional random vector. Details of the simulated workers are shown
in Table 3.1. Type 1 workers are malicious in both domains, answering questions
correctly with probability 0.5, type 2 workers answer questions in domain 0 correctly
with probability 0.95 and answer those in domain 1 correctly with probability 0.5
while type 3 workers answer questions in domain 0 correctly with probability 0.5 and
answer questions in domain 1 correctly with probability 0.95, and type 4 workers are
good at questions in both domains and answer questions correctly with probability
0.95. In order to show that our model mdc and mdfc works with increasing number
of workers that are not trustworthy, we simulated several groups of worker settings
with increasing number of type 1 workers.
We compare mdc with mv and sdc when no features are included and compare
mdfc with mv and sdc when features are incorporated. We use accuracy as the
evaluation criterion and report results in Table 3.2, where the first column denotes
worker settings.
When features are used, mdfc results in lowest error rates. When features
are omitted, mdc and sdc perform nearly equally well. This could be explained
by that when features are not utilized to infer domain distributions for questions,
the estimated domain distributions by mdc might be inconsistent with the truth.
However, mdc is still very attractive because it can still effectively estimate the
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Table 3.1: Worker settings for UCI datasets
worker type domain 0 domain 1
type 1 0.5 0.5
type 2 0.95 0.5
type 3 0.5 0.95
type 4 0.95 0.95
workers’ reliability in different domains as shown in Fig. 3.5(d). This can be useful
for task assignment adaptive to workers’ trust in the future. Specifically, upon
arrival of a new task, we can use the estimated profile of workers to match the
question belonging to a particular domain to a worker that is trustworthy in that
domain. For example, consider the case when we need to know the true label of a
new question that belongs to a certain domain. Then we can match the question
with workers that have the highest reliability in that domain.
In Fig. 3.5, we show that both mdc and mdfc can effectively estimate workers’
trust values in both domains considered. Each triangle stands for a worker’s trust
profile (a two-dimensional real-valuded trust vector) and the dotted circle is used
to cluster workers whose estimated trust values are close to each other. Taking a
closer look at Fig. 3.5(a), we see that one worker is clustered close to (0.51, 0.51),
two workes close to (0.95, 0.5), two workers close to (0.5, 0.96), and one worker close
to (0.95, 0.95). This estimation of trust vectors is consistent with the worker setting
(1, 2, 2, 1). Workers’ trust vectors can also be effectively estimated in other worker
settings in Fig. 3.5(b), Fig. 3.5(c), and Fig. 3.5(d).
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Table 3.2: Error rates of various methods on UCI dataset Pima Indians.
pima dataset mv sdc mdfc mdc
(1, 2, 2, 1) 0.098 0.040 0.009 ×
(2, 2, 2, 1) 0.103 0.042 0.009 ×
(3, 2, 2, 1) 0.150 0.042 0.008 ×
(1, 2, 2, 1),NF 0.098 0.040 × 0.039
(2, 2, 2, 1),NF 0.103 0.042 × 0.043
(3, 2, 2, 1),NF 0.150 0.042 × 0.041
In the expression (1, 2, 2, 1), the four numbers from left to right mean: there are 1
worker of type 1, 2 workers of type 2, 2 workers type 3, and 1 worker of type 4. NF
means omitting the features in pima dataset.
(a) Estimated mean value of trust about workers’
knowledge given worker setting (1,2,2,1).
(b) worker setting (2,2,2,1)
(c) worker setting (3,2,2,1) (d) worker setting (3,2,2,1) and no features avail-
able
Figure 3.5: Estimated worker reliability under different simulation settings on pima
indians dataset. The estimated trust about workers’ knowledge in Fig. 3.5(a),
Fig. 3.5(b), and Fig. 3.5(c) are by mdfc and the results in Fig. 3.5(d) are by mdc.
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3.1.7.2 Text Data
To evaluate mdtc, we tested our model on 1000 sentences from the corpus
of biomedical text with each sentence annotated by 5 workers [41]. Each worker
answers whether a given sentence contains contradicting statements (Polarity). Each
sentence has the scientific text along with the labels provided by 5 experts. However,
since the labels provided by experts are almost consensus and the naive majority
vote algorithm gives ground truth answers, we need to simulate workers of varying
trust of knowledge in different topics. When the number of topics (domains) is D,
we simulate D workers in total, where worker j answers topic j close to perfectly
(probabililty of right guess 0.97) and answers questions in topics other than j nearly
randomly (probability of right guess 0.64). For each simulation setting, we repeat
30 times and report the mean error rate.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comparative model that integrates
topics models into a probabilistic crowdsourcing framework in the literature, there-
fore we compare the performance of mdtc with mdc that ignores topic information
and with the baseline majority vote algorithm. The mean error rates are reported
in Table 3.3. We can see that in all experiments with the number of topics ranging
from 4 to 14, mdtc gives the lowest error rate, outperforming mdc by over 50%.
This strongly demonstrates the power of mdtc over other models that do not take
into account text information.
To further show that mdtc can effectively recover the reliability of workers in
different topics, we plot, for each worker, the mean value of trust for each worker
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Table 3.3: Error rates of various methods on Text:Polarity. T4 denotes the assump-
tion of 4 topics.
scientific text mv mdc mdtc
T4 0.181 0.095 0.044
T6 0.160 0.089 0.037
T8 0.141 0.082 0.034
T10 0.125 0.074 0.032
T12 0.116 0.069 0.032
T14 0.100 0.064 0.032
in each of the eight topics (T8) as a heatmap in Fig. 3.6. The x-axis denotes topic
index and the y-axis denotes worker index. The intensity of the color in the j-th
row and l-th column denotes the trust value of worker j in l-th dimension. We can
see that the diagonal blocks have more intense color than others, which is consistent
with the simulation setting where each worker j ∈ {0, 1, ..., 7} is trustworthy in topic
j and is not reliable in topics other than j. The estimated trust vectors of workers
in all eight topics can be very useful in the following scenario: if for example a new
question with concept vector [0.93, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01] is added, we
probably want to match this question with a worker whose trust vector has high
value in the first dimension. The representative words (top 10 words with the highest
probability in a particular topic) in all eight topics are shown in Table 3.4.
3.1.8 Proofs
This section derives the approximate posteriors in mdc, mdfc and mdtc using
variational inference.
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Figure 3.6: Trust matrix about workers’ knowledge over topics estimated by mdtc
model.
Table 3.4: representative words in topics on scientific text
topic0 ins, protein, cells, express, activity, mutant, re-
sulted, similar, human, rna
topic1 ins, cells, binding, two, presence, day, method,
study, acids, reporter
topic2 ins, binding, process, protein, cells, quot, factor,
structure, dna, splice
topic3 ins, cells, blotting, protein, using, analysis, west-
ern, express, antibodies, demonstrate
topic4 ins, signal, wnt, cells, activity, resulted, using, pro-
tein, pathway, regulation
topic5 ins, system, two, sequences, suggest, cloning, data,
effects, transcripts, different
topic6 ins, activity, cells, dna, binding, forms, gene, re-
quired, phosphorylation, receptor
topic7 ins, min, cells, containing, activity, described, in-
cubated, protein, mms, buffer
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3.1.8.1 Updates in mdc
Update each factor q(βjl) by variational approach, q(βjl) has the following form:














q(Ci = l)q(Ri 6= lij)
 ln (1− βjl)
(3.24)
We can see that the above posterior of q(βjl) has Beta distribution Beta(θ̃jl) with
parameter θ̃jl = [θ̃jl0, θ̃jl1], where θ̃jl0 = θjl0 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri 6= lij) and
θ̃jl1 = θjl1 +
∑
i∈Nj q(Ci = l)q(Ri = lij).
Update each factor q(ri) the optimal approximate posterior of q(ri) takes the
form:





ln p (lij|ri, Ci, βj)













where qil = q(Ci = l). The expectation of logarithmic beta variables
E
q





ln (1− βjl) = ψ(θ̃jl0)− ψ(θ̃jl1 + θ̃jl0)
where ψ(·) is digamma function. Then q(ri) is normalized in order to be a valid
probability.
Update each factor q(λi) assume λi takes a Dirichlet prior with parameter
{αl}Dl=1. We have
ln q(λi) ∝ ln p(λi) + E
q
ln p(Ci|λi)
= ln p(λi) +
D∑
l=1





where α̃il = αl + q(Ci = l). It is evident that the posterior q(λi) also has a Dirichlet
distribution with parameters {α̃il}Dl=1.
Update each factor q(Ci) We have
ln q(Ci = l) ∝ E
q(λi)
ln p(Ci = l|λi) + E
q
























3.1.8.2 Updates in mdfc
The updates in mdc are divided into two steps: E-step and M-step. In E-step,
we obtain the approximate posterior distributions for different random variables in
our model given current estimates of model parameters µl’s, Σl’s, w, and δ. In
M-step, the model parameters are obtained given current posterior approximations.
E-step and M-step are iterated until convergence.
E-step Since the updates of posterior distributions of βj’s and λi’s are the same
as those in mdc, we just show the updates of q(Ci)’s and q(ri)’s below:
For q(Ci), besides the terms in equation (3.27), it has an extra term:
ln p (xi|Ci = l, µl,Σl) =−
1
2
(xi − µl)T Σ−1l (xi − µl)−
1
2
ln |Σl| (xi − µl)
(3.28)
where (∗)T denotes the transpose of the term inside the parenthesis. For q(ri),
besides the terms in equation (3.25), it has an additional term:
p(ri|xi) = σ(wTxi + δ)1{ri=1}
(
1− σ(wTxi + δ)
)1{ri=0}
= σ(wTxi + δ)
1{ri=1}σ(−wTxi − δ)1{ri=0}
(3.29)
where σ(∗) denotes the sigmoid function and 1{ri = 1} denotes the indicator func-
tion that equals to 1 if ri = 1 and equals to 0 if not. The second equality in
equation (3.29) holds because for the sigmoid function we have σ(−z) = 1− σ(z).
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M-step In order to estimate the model parameters µl’s, Σl’s, w, and δ, we adopt
alternating optimization by optimizing one set of the parameters while fixing the
others. The objective function is the expectation of the logarithm of the likelihood
function Q = Eq ln p (L,R, β, C, λ|µ,Σ, w, δ) given current approximate posteriors
q. Then we have:
µnewl =
∑N
i=1 q(Ci = l)xi∑N
i=1 q(Ci = l)
Σnewl =
∑
i q(Ci = l) (xi − µnewl ) (xi − µnewl )
T∑N


















Txi + δ)− q(ri = 0)σ(−wTxi − δ)
]
(3.30)




and use the L-BFGS quasi-Newton method [42].
3.1.8.3 Updates in mdtc
The updates for the parameters of the variational posterior distribution for
Ci, βjl, and ri remain the same since no additional dependencies for those variables
are introduced as shown in Fig. 3.4. We derive the posteriors for λi, ziw, and φl.
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Update each factor q(λi) We have
ln q(λi) ∝ exp
{















where α̃il = αl + q(Ci = l) +
∑
w niwηiwl. αl is the parameter of the prior Dirichlet
distribution of λ.
Update each factor q(φl) We have





ln p (wik|φl, zik)
= ln p(φl) +
∑
i,k
q (zik = l) lnφlwik
(3.32)
It is evident that φl has a Dirichlet posterior distribution with parameter:




Update each factor q(ziw) We have
ln ηiwl ∝ E
q









where Eq lnφlw = ψ(Υ̃lw) − ψ(
∑
w′ Υ̃lw′ ). Then we need to normalize ηiwl, l =
1, . . . , D to form valid probabilities.
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3.1.9 Summary
In this problem, we propose a probabilistic model (mdc) that captures multi-
domain characteristics of crowdsourcing questions and multi-dimensional trust of
workers’ knowledge. To show that our model mdc is very flexible and extensible to
incorporate additional metadata associated with questions, we propose an extended
model mdfc that incorporates continuously-valued features of questions and mdtc
that also combines topic discovery. mdtc has the advantage that the domains
are interpretable. We show that our proposed models have superior performance
compared to state-of-the-art on two real datasets and can effectively recover the
trust vectors of workers. This can be very useful in task assignment adaptive to
workers’ trust values in different dimensions in the future. We assume answers from
workers are collected first and are then fed to models for inference. For future work,
we will investigate the problem of choosing which question to be labeled next by
which worker based on the trust vectors of workers.
The results in this chapter can be applied for fusion of information from mul-
tiple unreliable data sources instead of just workers in the open crowd. Examples
of data sources are sensors, human input, and inference results given by another
system backed by a different set of machine learning algorithms. Each of the data
sources can be treated as a ”worker” in this chapter and we can thereafter use mod-
els to estimate the multi-domain trust values of the data sources and true labels of
questions.
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3.2 Trust-aware crowdsourcing with domain knowledge
3.2.1 Motivation
In a typical crowdsourcing setting, multiple workers are solicited to provided
answers for each of the questions. For example, Facebook users volunteer to perform
various annotation tasks on Facebook edit page2, or workers on Amazon Mechanical
Turk 3 get paid for solving various tasks uploaded by task requesters. An example
task is to determine whether a given plaintext headline expresses one or more of the
emotions anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise. So there are six questions
associated with a single headline. Our observation is that these questions are not
independent. If the system is more confident that a headline exhibits anger emotion,
then the headline is not likely to express joy. In addition, workers that provide
answers for these questions tend to give similar answers if they share same attributes.
These observations motivate us to ultilize these logical constraints, which we call
domain knowledge, to more accurately estimate true labels of questions as well as
trust values of workers.
In this problem, we propose a trust-aware crowdsourcing with domain knowl-
edge framework (tcdk) [43]. It is a two-layered probabilistic graphical model, where
the top layer encodes the logical relationships using first-order logic rules and the
bottom layer encodes the probabilistic dependencies between random variables in




of the top and bottom layers is equivalent to a special rule, called cost-function rule
with a fixed weight of 1.0. This two-layered framework can be seen as a general-
ized probabilistic soft logic framework that contains both logical and probabilistic
relations while the probabilistic soft logic in [44] only contains logical relations.
tcdk allows users to integrate high level domain knowledge easily into traditional
crowdsourcing graphical models without having to derive a whole new model from
scratch. More importantly, the leverage of domain knowledge can help the system
better estimate true labels of questions and at the same time more accurately esti-
mate the trust values of workers. To jointly infer the true labels of questions and
trust values of workers, we develop an inference algorithm based on the alternating
direction method of multipliers. More specifically, the algorithm alternates between
optimizing variables in the lower layer while fixing variables in the upper layer and
optimizing variables in the upper layer while fixing variables in the bottom layer.
Our contributions are the following:
1. We formulate a novel trust-aware crowdsourcing with domain knowledge frame-
work that combines domain knowledge with a traditional crowdsourcing graph-
ical model. Users can express high level domain knowledge without having to
re-define the model and the framework can be used to integrate multiple data
sources.
2. We develop a scalable joint inference algorithm for estimating true label vari-
ables and trust values of workers based on alternating consensus optimization.
The inference algorithm can be easily scaled to multiple machines.
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3.2.2 Related work
To address the issue of noisy and malicious workers in crowdsourcing systems,
many models are developed to jointly estimate true labels of questions and trust of
workers [33–35,45]. All these works are based on the assumption that questions’ true
label variables are independent and the trusts of different workers are independent
too. However, the assumption is shown to be invalid in the annotation of headline
emotion example in Section 3.2.1.
[46] did consider dependency between workers by revealing the latent group
structure among dependent workers and aggregated information at the group level
rather than from individual workers. Still, their model did not capture the logical
dependencies among questions as in our work. In the natural language process-
ing literature, a framework called Fold·All [47] was proposed to integrate domain
knowledge into Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). Their framework can be seen as
an extension of the Markov Logic Network while the top layer of our framework can
be seen as the generalized probabilistic soft logic [44].
3.2.3 Graphical model framework for trust-aware crowdsourcng with
domain knowledge
We consider a crowdsourcing task with N questions and M workers available
in total. Each question is answered by a subset of M workers. Each worker j is
modeled by a random variable βj ∈ [0, 1] that has a Dirichlet prior with parameter
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θ. Higher value of βj indicates that the worker is more trustworthy. The variable
zi ∈ {0, 1} is used to denote question i’s true label. The answer to question i given
by worker j is denoted by lij ∈ {0, 1}.
We first review the graphical model used in [35]:





p (βj|θ) p (lij|zi, βj) (3.34)
where Mi is the set of workers that give answers to question i. The task is to infer
questions’ true labels zi’s and estimate workers’ trust values βj’s.
In the above model, the true labels zi’s are assumed to be independent. In
tcdk, we incorporate the logical relations between questions using first-order logic
rule syntax. Example rules are:
ContainsHappiness(i)⇒ ContainsAnger(i)
Trust(j1) ∧ SimilarBackground(j1, j2)⇒ Trust(j2)
(3.35)
The first rule states that if text clip i expresses emotion happiness, then it is un-
likely that the text expresses anger and the second rule states that if the worker j1
is trustworthy and he has similar background with another worker j2, the worker
j2 tends to be trustworthy too. For each first-order logic rule ` as defined in equa-
tion (3.35), we represent the weight of the rule as λ` and the set of groundings of rule
r as R`. Higher value of λ` indicates that the rule ` is more important compared to
other rules. For each grounded rule r, we associate a non-negative potential function
φr(z, β). We will discuss the specific definition of φr(z, β) later.
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Putting together the domain knowledge expressed using first-order logic rules
as in equation (3.35) and the traditional crowdsourcing model in equation (3.34),
our proposed model Crowdsourcing with Domain Knowledge (tcdk) defines a gen-
erative model expressed as follows:












p (βj|θ) p (lij|zi, βj)
(3.36)
where R is the number of grounded first-order logic rules. The graphical model
in equation (3.36) consists of two terms with the first term encoding the logical
relations among variables z, β and the second encoding probabilistic dependencies
among observed answers L and hidden variables z and β. The logical dependency
encoded in φr(z, β) is very general and is determined by the specific grounded rule
r. For example, it can be defined over true label variables zi’s or over trust variables
βj’s or over a mixture of both as in equation (3.35). Fig. 3.7 shows an example causal
structure of tcdk when φr’s are defined over z only. In Fig. 3.7, the statistical layer
corresponds to the first term in equation (3.36) and the logical layer corresponds
to the second term. The red dotted lines represent logical dependencies among z
indicated by φr(z).
Note that βj’s are continuously-valued variables and zi’s are discrete variables.
If φr(z, β)’s depend on βj’s only, the first part in equation (3.36) is equivalent to
a continuous Markov random field [44]. If φr(z, β)’s also depend on zi’s, the first
part combined with the second part in equation (3.36) can be viewed as a Hybrid
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Figure 3.7: Graphical Model of Trust-aware Crowdsourcing with Domain Knowledge
(tcdk). zi’s are true label variables, βj’s are workers’ trust variables, and lij’s
are worker-provided answers. The black-dotted lines in the bottom layer encode
probabilistic dependencies between variables and the red-dotted lines in the upper
layer encode logical dependencies.
Markov Logic Network (HMLN) [48]. However, HMLN relies solely on first-order
logic to express causal structure among variables, therefore it falls short of expressing
general dependencies as in the second term in equation (3.36).
3.2.4 Scalable inference algorithm based on ADMM
We are interested in the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimates
of true label variables zi’s and trust variables βj’s given answers L in tcdk. The















It is challenging to solve the above optimization problem due to the large data size
and possibly exponential groundings of first-order logic rules. One can relax the
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discrete variables to take continuous values and resort to Alternating Optimization
with Mirror Descent to avoid fully grounding first-order logic rules [47]. However,
their algorithm still can not scale because a single machine is processing all the
sampled groundings and the algorithm is not easily scaled to multiple machines. [49]
proposed a scalable solution to constrained continuous Markov random fields based
on the consensus optimization framework. However, it can not be directly applied
to our problem because their optimization objective is based on hinge loss only.
In what follows, we propose a scalable inference algorithm based on the alter-
nating direction method of multipliers (admm). First, we relax true label variables
zi’s to the interval [0, 1] so that the potential functions φr(z, β)’s are defined over
continuous variables taking values from interval [0, 1]. The algorithm can be seen as
generalized probabilistic soft logic (gpsl) because it contains special cost-function
rules besides first-order logic rules. We briefly review the basics of probabilistic soft
logic (psl) below.
3.2.4.1 Definitions in probabilistic soft logic
Probabilistic soft logic declares first-order logic rules:
λ : A(i, j) ∧B(j, k)⇒ C(i, k) (3.38)
where A, B and C are predicates and i, j, k are variables. Each ground predicate
is an instantiation of predicates with instatiated values for i, j, k and takes a soft-
truth value from [0, 1]. The logical connectives (AND, OR, NOT) are relaxed using
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Lukasiewicz t-norm and its corresponding co-norm:
p ∧ q = max (0, p+ q − 1) ,
p ∨ q = min (1, p+ q) ,
¬p = 1− p
(3.39)
Any grounded first-order logic rule has the form rbody → rhead. An interpretation
I is defined as an assignment of soft truth values to a set of ground predicates.
PSL calculates a potential function for any grounded rule r under interpretation I
through the following:
φr(I) = max{0, I(rbody)− I(rhead)} (3.40)
3.2.4.2 Scalable ADMM-based inference
admm is utilized to optimize objectives by iteratively solving local subproblems
and finding consensus to the global objective [50]. We observe that zi’s and βj’s are
coupled through the term log p (lij|zi, βj). Therefore we can iteratively optimize











log p (lij|zi, βj) (3.41)
The first term in equation (3.41) corresponds to weighted summation of potential
functions of grounded first-order logic rules while the second term is the summation
of logarithms of conditional probabilities. We show next that we can put the two
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parts into a unified framework gpsl.
ϕ(zi, βj) = − log p (lij|zi, βj)
= −1{lij = zi} log βj − 1{lij 6= zi} log(1− βj)
= − (zilij + (1− zi)(1− lij)) log βj
− (1− zilij − (1− zi)(1− lij)) log(1− βj)
(3.42)











The second term in equation (3.43) is equivalent to the summation of potential
functions introduced by N grounded special cost-function rules with weight 1.0.
They encode the dependency between upper and bottom layer shown in Fig. 3.7.










ϕ(zi, βj)− log p (βj|θ)
 (3.44)
where the first term corresponds to the summation of potential functions for grounded
first-order logic rules that involve β while the second term can be viewed as the sum-
mation of potential functions introduced by M grounded special cost-function rules
with weight 1.0.
Let zr, r = 1, . . . , R be a local copy of the variables in Z that are used in
potential function φr(z, β) and zi+R be a local copy of the variables in Z that are
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used in potential function
∑
j∈Mi ϕ(zi, βj). Let Zi, i = 1, . . . , R + N be the global
version of the local copies in zi. Similarly, we define br, r = 1, . . . , R as a local copy
of the global variables in B that are used in φr(z, β) and bj+R, j = 1, . . . ,M as a
local copy of the variables in B used in
∑
i∈Nj ϕ(zi, βj)− log p (βj|θ) , j = 1, . . . ,M.
The admm-based inference algorithm is shown in Algorithm (6). It is scalable in
nature because each grounded rule is a subproblem and can be run in parallel over
multiple machines.
3.2.5 Case studies and experiments on real datasets
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed tcdk framework, we
performed experiments on two real datasets. In what follows, we describe each of
the datasets, define first-order logic rules and special cost-function rules, and present
experimental results. For each of the two datasets, we consider the following models
for comparison:
1. tcdk: our proposed trust-aware crowdsourcing with domain knowledge.
2. tc (trust-aware crowdsourcing without domain knowledge): same as tcdk
except that we omit domain knowledge by setting zero weights to first-order
logic rules and special cost-function rules defined for each dataset.
3. mv (majority vote): a true value variable is estimated to be 1 if more than
half workers answer 1 and is estimated to be 0 if less than half workers answer
0. Ties are broken randomly.
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Algorithm 6: Consensus optimization for z and β
Input: φ, λ, L, Z, B, θ, ϕ, ρ > 0
Output: MAP estimates for zi’s and βj’s
while not converged do
/* Optimize zi’s while fixing βj’s */
Initialize zi as a copy of the variables in Z that appear in φr, r = 1, . . . , R
Initialize zi+R as a copy of the variables in Z that appear in∑
j∈Mi ϕ(zi, βj), i = 1, . . . , N
Initialize dual variable yk = 0, k = 1, . . . , |R|+N
while not converged do
for k = 1, 2, . . . , R,R + 1, . . . , R +N do
yk = yk + ρ (zk − Zk)
end
for r = 1, 2, . . . , R do





∥∥∥zr − Zr + 1ρyr∥∥∥2
2
end
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N do




j∈Mi ϕ(zi, βj) +
ρ
2
∥∥∥zi+R − Zi+R + 1ρyi+R∥∥∥2
2
end
Set each entry zi in Z to the average of the all the local copies.
end
/* Optimize βj’s while fixing zi’s */
Initialize br as a copy of the variables in B that appear in φr, r = 1, . . . , R
Initialize bj+R as a copy of the variables in B that appear in∑
i∈Nj ϕ(zi, βj)− log p (βj|θ) , j = 1, . . . ,M
Initialize dual variables vk = 0, k = 1, . . . ,M,M + 1, R +M
while not converged do
for k = 1, . . . , R,R + 1, R +M do
vk = vk + ρ(bk −Bk)
end
for r = 1, 2, . . . , R do





∥∥∥br −Br + 1ρvr∥∥∥2
2
end
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M do




i∈Nj ϕ(zi, βj)− log p (βj|θ) +
ρ
2
∥∥∥bj+R −Bj+R + 1ρvi+R∥∥∥2
2
end




3.2.5.1 Affective Text Evaluation
This dataset was produced by crowdsourcing task [51] where each worker was
given a headline and asked to give a rating (ranging from 0 to 100) about the
degree of emotions that the headline expresses. Six emotions were considered: anger,
disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise. We use the dataset provided by [32], where
100 pieces of headlines were selected and 10 answers were solicited for each of the
six emotions from workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Note that each headline-
emotion pair might be answered by a different group of workers.
We represent a headline Q expressing emotion X as predicate tl(Q,X), where
Q = 1, . . . , N and
X ∈ {Anger,Disgust, Fear, Joy, Sadness, Surprise}. The grounded predicate tl(Q,X)
takes value from [0, 1]. Our domain knowledge tells us that among those six emo-
tions, there exists two types of relations between emotions X and Y , one is similar
relation which we define as predicate simRel(X, Y ) and the other is opposite relation
which we define as predicate oppRel(X, Y ). Y takes values from the six emotions
as X does. We define the following first-order logic rules to represent our domain
knowledge:
tl(Q,X) ∧ oppRel(X, Y )→ ¬tl(Q, Y ), w : 5.0
tl(Q,X) ∧ simRel(X, Y )→ tl(Q, Y ), w : 1.0
(3.45)
The first rule states that if a headline expresses emotion X and the two emotions
X and Y are opposite, it is unlikely that the headline expresses emotion Y whereas
the second rule states that if X and Y are similar, there is a chance that a headline
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Table 3.5: Emotions relations
Relations Emotion pairs
Opposite (Anger, Joy), (Anger, Fear),
(Anger, Sadness),(Anger, Sur-
prise) (Disgust, Joy), (Disgust,
Sadness), (Fear, Joy), (Sadness,
Joy), (Surprise, Joy), (Surprise,
Sadness)
Similar (Fear, Sadness)
expresses emotion Y if it expresses emotion X. The weights for the two first-order
logic rules are assumed to be known and set to 5.0 and 1.0 respectively. Higher
weight of the first rule indicates it is a more important rule than the second. The
values of grounded predicates oppRel(X, Y ) and simRel(X, Y ) are assumed to be
part of our domain knowledge. The details of these two grounded predicates are
shown in Table 3.5. For example, we believe that a headline can not express Anger
and Joy at the same time. In addition to the first-order logic rules, we define the
cost-function rules:
LinearLoss(β, tl(Q,X)), w : 1.0 (3.46)
The rule corresponds to the second term in equation (3.43). The predicate is called
LinearLoss because the potential function associated with this rule is linear in
tl(Q,X) as can be observed from equation (3.42) and equation (3.43).
We conducted coarse-grained experiments on Affective Text dataset, i.e. each
rating is mapped to 0 if the original value is smaller than 50 and 1 if larger or equal
to 50. We calculate the precision, recall, F-measure and accuracy of all emotions for
the tcdk model. The results are reported in Table 3.6. The highest scores in all the
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Table 3.6: Performance of algorithms on affective text
Model precision recall F1 accuracy
tcdk 31.91 75.00 44.48 93.83%
tc 34.04 51.61 41.03 92.33%
mv 34.04 47.06 39.51 91.83%
measures are in bold format. We observe that our model tcdk obtained best results
with respect to recall, F1 score, and accuracy. This demonstrates the advantage of
taking into consideration domain knowledge compared to tc that ignores it.
3.2.5.2 Fashion Social Dataset Evaluation
The dataset [52] contains 4711 images crawled from Flickr and along with each
image, metadata are available such as the fashion topic used to query the image,
title of the image, tags and comments made by Flickr users, etc. In this annotation
task, a worker is presented with two questions for each image: Is the image fashion
related? Is the image showing a specialty clothing item? Therefore we have in total
9422 questions. For each image, a number of workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) provide their answers. Each answer takes values from {Y es,No,NotSure}.
If a worker answers NotSure, we treat it as if the worker does not provide an answer
for this question. We filter out questions that receive less than three answers and
we are left with N = 8538 questions, each of which receives equal to or more than
three answers from workers. We have in total M = 201 workers available for this
annotation task. To generate ground truth, three trusted experts were recruited to
give high-quality annotations. We take the majority vote from the three trusted
experts as the ground truth and use it for evaluation of our models.
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The question ”Is the image related to fashion?” for image Q is denoted by
predicate fashion(Q), where Q ∈ {1, . . . , N} and the question ”Is the image related
to cloth?” for image Q by predicate cloth(Q). One piece of the domain knowledge
we have is that if an image is related to cloth, the image is more likely to be related
to fashion. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.8. Knowing that the probability of the image
being cloth-related is conducive to estimating whether the image is fashion-related.
This observation is captured in the following rule:
cloth(Q)→ fashion(Q), w : 5.0 (3.47)
Another observation, as shown in Fig. 3.9, is that if two questions are similar in
terms of the metadata, then the true labels of the two questions are likely to be the
same. The following rules capture the observation:
sim(Q1, Q2) ∧ fashion(Q1)→ fashion(Q2), w : 1.0
sim(Q1, Q2) ∧ cloth(Q1)→ cloth(Q2), w : 1.0
(3.48)
where Q denotes an image and the predicate sim(Q1, Q2) represents a question-
question similarity metric. Each specific similarity metric creates an instance of the
two rules in equation (3.48).
We propose to use a context-based similarity metric. An image context refers
to a group photo pool or a photoset. One of the example contexts is Artistic Pho-
tography. An image can be associated with one or more contexts. The intuition is
that if two pictures are more likely to be in the same context, then they tend to
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Table 3.7: Performance of algorithms on Fashion Dataset
Model precision recall F1 accuracy
tcdk 87.83 89.84 88.82 89.27%
tc 86.79 83.6 85.20 85.39%
mv 86.55 83.73 85.11 85.32%
have the same label as well. We denote C1 as the context set for Q1 and C2 as the





To avoid quadratic groundings of sim(Q1, Q2), for each question Q1 we only keep
pairs (Q1, Q2)’s whose similarity scores in equation (3.49) rank at the top 10 as
in [53]. Similar to the model for the Affective Text dataset, the special cost-function
rules that bridge the gap between the top and the bottom layers are:
LinearLoss(β, fashion(Q)), w : 1.0
LinearLoss(β, cloth(Q)), w : 1.0
(3.50)
We perform ten-fold cross validation with each fold leaving out 10% of data.
We estimate values of fashion(Q) and cloth(Q) on the held-out fold and then map
them to 0 or 1 using threshold 0.5. The results are shown in Table 3.7. Again,
results show that tcdk achieves better performance in all criteria with integrated
domain knowledge than tc alone (without the leverage of domain knowledge).
The weights of first-order logic rules defined for both datasets in Section 3.2.5.1
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Figure 3.8: Estimated true labels for ”cloth related” questions can be used for










Figure 3.9: Estimated true labels for questions can be used for prediction of other
questions using image similarity.
Though weights can be auto-tuned using maximum-likelihood estimation [44], we
leave this problem for future work and aim to demonstrate the power of our model
with fixed yet not fine-tuned values set by users of our model.
3.2.6 Summary
We presented trust-aware crowdsourcing with domain knowledge (tcdk), a
unifying framework that combines the power of domain knowledge and traditional
crowdsourcing graphical model. It allows users to express domain knowledge using
first-order logic rules without redefining the model. To estimate questions’ true
labels and workers’ trust values, we develop a scalable inference algorithm based on
alternating consensus optimization. We demonstrate that our model is superior to
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the state-of-the-art by testing it on two real datasets.
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Chapter 4: Trust-Aware Optimal Crowdsourcing With Budget Con-
straint
4.1 Motivation
Crowdsourcing provides a convenient and efficient way for data collection with-
out having to acquire costly labels from domain experts. In a typical crowdsourcing
task, a requester distributes small jobs to non-expert workers and provides a small
amount of payment upon job completion. Such a small job can be translating a
sentence [54], annotating an image [55], classifying search queries [56], etc. Answers
(or labels) obtained from workers are usually noisy due to workers’ lack of expertise,
carelessness, or malicious labeling. To mitigate the noise, one question is redun-
dantly distributed to multiple workers and the answers are aggregated to produce
a single answer, expected to be more accurate. Many crowdsourcing platforms are
available, for example, Amazon Mechanical Turk, ESP game and reCaptcha.
One typical goal in crowdsourcing tasks is to infer the ground truth from
collected answers. Much work [32, 36, 37] in crowdsourcing has been devoted to
making aggregated decisions to predict true labels given noisy and even malicious
input from workers. However, these algorithms do not consider the cost incurred
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from obtaining a label from a worker; while in practice, the number of answers we
can get is restricted by the budget coming with requesters. Under this constraint, a
natural question to ask is how to allocate tasks to workers adaptively with limited
budget.
Past approaches to crowdsourcing with budget constraint have assumed that
all questions and workers are homogeneous – questions do not differ in difficulty
level, and all workers are as capable as each other and get the same payment for
answering any question. This can be an over-simplified setting for real problems. In
practice, the cost depends on both the question and the worker. For example, fine
category classification of different kinds of birds requires more domain knowledge
than simply telling if there is a bird in an image; summarizing a paragraph needs
more work than deciding if a tweet is positive or negative. Requesters generally
pay more to workers for difficult tasks. On the other hand, skillful workers ask for
higher payment than ordinary workers, and have a larger chance of providing the
ground truth. For example, for the same task, consulting a domain expert is more
costly than asking a random worker on Mechanical Turk; however, on average more
Turks are required to infer the correct answer. Thus there is a trade-off between
cost and answer quality. A more cost-efficient way to task distribution than blind
random assignment would be to assign easy tasks to cheap workers and hard tasks
to workers with more expertise. The answers given by workers are then combined
with estimated trustworthiness of workers. We consider the trustworthiness of a
worker as equivalent to the worker’s reliability. Therefore use trust and reliability
interchangably in this chapter. Specifically, expert level crowd has higher trust value
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while common non-expert crowd has lower trust value.
In this chapter, we address the problem of trust-aware task allocation by
considering cost and expertise variation among workers. We propose an easy-to-
implement allocation algorithm in the setting of weighted majority vote with the-
oretical guarantee. We formulate the assignment problem as a nonlinear integer
programming problem with budget constraint, and relax it to a convex optimiza-
tion problem that has an analytical solution. We also give a theoretical error bound
for the performance of our algorithm [57]
Our contributions are as follows:
• We formulate the problem of trust-aware task allocation in crowdsourcing and
provide a principled way to solve it.
• Our formulation models the workers’ trustworthiness and the costs depend on
both the question and the worker group. Our method is ready to be extended
to more complicated aggregation method other than the weighted majority
vote as well.
• The trust-aware task allocation scheme we propose can achieve total error




B), where N is the number of tasks and B
is the total budget. Different from [4], the exact performance bound of error
probability also incorporates both trustworthiness of crowds and cost. More
trustworthy crowds and less costly jobs result in lower guaranteed bound.
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4.2 Related work
Most previous works focus on aggregating labels from multiple workers. None
of them address a practical issue: the job requester has a budget constraint and he
wants to make the best use of the requester’s budget. A closely related work along
this line is Crowdscreen [58] that developed algorithms for minimizing expected cost
regarding number of questions asked and the estimation accuracy. However, the cost
of assigning different questions is assumed to be uniform and the heuristics-based
algorithms have no theoretical guarantee of performance. This guarantee is given
in [59] where all questions are homogeneous and the upper bound they derived is
valid only when the number of questions assigned approaches infinity, rendering
it impractical. Works that further investigate the problem of task assignment for
heterogeneous tasks include [4,60]. The former is focused on minimizing cost subject
to a quality constraint when workers arrive online while the latter is in the direction
of minimizing estimation error under budget constraint and the cost associated with
questions varies w.r.t difficulty. In particular, in [4], cost is determined by only the
difficulty of questions and they can not choose explicitly which experts to choose
for the completion of the task.
4.3 Problem setting
We consider classification tasks where the wisdom of crowds is utilized to es-
timate the ground truth of each instance. We assume that there are N tasks and
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the difficulty of task i can be mapped to a real number di. We consider binary
classification and denote the unknown true label of task i by ri ∈ {−1, 1}. How-
ever, our algorithm can be applied to general classification tasks as well. We further
assume that there are M crowds available for the job requesters. As can be ex-
pected, in real life, some crowds behave professionally and provide reliable answers,
while other crowds are not as trustworthy, either because they have lower expertise
level or because they want to get the payment without investing enough effort. We
denote the answer given by a worker k from crowd j for task i as `jki ∈ {−1, 1}.
The job requester comes to the crowdsourcing market with a fixed budget B and
he/she expects to get the highest performance out of the given budget. The crowd-
sourcing platform has a scheduler that distributes tasks to its pool of workers. Each
assignment of task i to a worker from crowd j is associated with a cost cij.
We adopt a 1-coin model to describe the worker’s stochastic behavior when
answering a specific question. The 1-coin model assumes the probability of labeling a
question with 1 given ri = 0 equals the probability of labeling it with 0 given ri = 1.
We denote the probability of getting a correct answer of task i given by worker k
from crowd j by uijk . A higher value of uijk indicates higher trust value. Extension
of our work to a 2-coin model (a worker is modeled by two parameters when the
truth label is binary, i.e. the probability of giving correct label when truth label is 0
and the probability of giving correct label when truth label is 1) is straightforward.
Given the symmetry present in the definition of the 1-coin model, without loss of
generality, we assume that the true label ri of task i is 1. Thus the answer given
by worker k from crowd j follows the Bernoulli distribution: `ijk ∼ Bin(1, uijk). For
97
each task i, a user from crowd j is sampled according to some unknown distribution
and we denote the expected trust value of crowd j toward task i E[uijk ] as uij. Note
that the random variables uij and uijk are unknown.
We assume that there is a separate trust evaluation component that assesses
each worker’s trustworthiness and outputs estimates of a crowd’s trust value, de-
noted by wj ∈ [0, 1], which represents the trust evaluation component’s belief about
the probability that workers from crowd j’s answer a question correctly. We choose
to estimate the trust value of a whole crowd instead of individual workers. In re-
ality, companies like CrowdFlower1 provides hierarchies of workers ranging from
domain experts to average open crowd, thus it is more reasonable to keep track of
the performance of each crowd than that of individuals.











where wj is the estimated trust value of crowd j, `jki is the answer to question i
provided by worker j who belongs to crowd j, and nij is the number of workers from
crowd j allocated for question i. The above estimation is a very basic algorithm
in crowdsourcing and is usually used as the baseline or a preprocessing step for
more sophisticated methods. Therefore, we use the error probability based on the
weighted majority vote as an upper bound of the error probability we can achieve.
Given the fixed budget provided by the job requester, the scheduler has two options.
1http://www.crowdflower.com/
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It either assigns a set of budget constraints Bi for each task i since we don’t want
to allocate all the budget to a single question or the scheduler just has a budget
constraint on the total expense for completing all the tasks. For each task i, multiple
workers are assigned to provide answers for it. The number of workers from crowd
j assigned to task i is denoted by nij and the set of workers assigned to task i can
be compactly expressed as ni = {nij}Mj=1. In the setting of fixed total budget across



















which is generally a non-deterministic nonlinear integer programming problem. When
we substitute question i’s true label ri with the estimated label r̂i using the weighted
majority vote equation (4.1), equation (4.2) is relaxed.
There is a trust evaluation component that gives estimation of crowds’ trust-
worthiness wj. Note that sometimes we might need trustworthiness of a crowd with
respect to different types of questions, which is questions of varying difficulty in our
case. For simplicity, in Algorithm (7) and Algorithm (8) that follow in Section 4.4,
just a scalar parameter wj is assumed for each crowd. Extension to trustworthiness
with respect to each type of questions is straighforward. The design of the trust
evaluation algorithm is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Interested readers are
referred to [24, 61] for basics on trust models. We assume we can get access to the
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estimation of trustworthiness given by this component and our allocation scheme
goes from there. Our allocation scheme works with a general trust estimation com-
ponent. Note that trust estimation is usually not given and incurs further cost.
However, practical crowdsourcing platforms use a pipeline model, where separate
components are dedicated to trust estimation, task allocation and answer inference.
We intend to keep our job (task allocation) as independent from others as possible,
yet flexible enough to join with any algorithm of other components. The output of
our allocation scheme is a set of assignments nij. Note that we are considering task
assignment before tasks are deployed in the crowdsourcing market, i.e., trust values
are static in this case. This is justified by the observation that most crowdsourcing
marketplaces like Amazon Mechanical Turk require preset numbers of workers to
questions before deployment. That said, given time-varying trust estimates, our
method can be easily made online – do partial assignment, wait for answers, update
trust estimates and do another batch of assignment.
4.4 Trust-aware task allocation
Our proposed budget allocation strategy is trust-aware in the sense that it
utilizes the estimated trustworthiness of crowds given by trust evaluation component
and allocation decision is partially influenced by the estimation. The process works
as follows. We present the optimal budget allocation scheme with total budget
constraint. The job allocator selectively assigns multiple workers from each crowd
j to each task i given the estimated trustworthiness wj and cost cij.
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4.4.1 Assumptions
For question i, we assume that the user k from crowd j samples his/her answer
`jki from a Bernoulli distribution, i.e., `jki ∼ Bin(1, uijk). The expected answer
EBin(1,uijk )[`jki] is µijk . We assume that a user k is picked from a crowd j uniformly
and Ek∼Uj [µijk ] = µij, where µij denotes expected trust value of crowd j. For
an allocation {nij}, i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,M , we define the expected answer for












and is fully determined by the allocation {nij}. We assume
that the weighted majority voting aggregating scheme yields a somewhat reasonable
performance for the given task i under uniform allocation, i.e. ρij = ρi,∀j:

µi ≥ 0 if ri = 1
µi < 0 if ri = −1
(4.4)
This means that if our assignment for question i is at least as good as uniformly
random assignment, the expected answer for question i in equation (4.3) has the







k=1wj`jki. The error probability of task i in equation (4.2)
can be relaxed by using the Hoeffding concentration bound:
Pr (r̂i 6= ri) ≤ exp
−
(∑M








where uij denotes the expected trust value of crowd j and wj denotes the estimated
trust value for crowd j. equation (4.5) makes the problem in equation (4.2) a
deterministic optimization problem. However, this is not convex in general.
Next we discuss how to relax the deterministic objective function on the right
hand side of equation (4.5) by probably approximately correct learning framework
(PAC) [62]. We consider the situation where the actual obtained answer deviates





































= β, where β is a chosen real number from 0 to
1. This means that with probability at least (1 − β)N , the following holds: r̂i ∈
[µi − εi, µi + εi] ∀i. We express εi as:
εi =




In practice, the value of β depends on the required confidence level. Usually
β is small, thus the above interval for r̂i is of high probability. In the following
argument we will only consider the case where r̂i lies in the interval [µi− εi, µi + εi].






≥ 0, the answer will always be
correct. If µi − εi < 0, then we will get the wrong answer with probability εi−µi2εi .
Therefore, in the interval we are considering, we have









where µmin = minµij.
We would like to minimize the error probability summing over the N tasks,


















































nij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,M
(4.8)

















if j = j∗i
0 if j 6= j∗i
, (4.9)




and i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
From the optimal allocation scheme we can see that our model prefers the most cost-
efficient crowd in terms of the ratio of its level of trust over cost. Since nij might
be fractional, we set it to be bnijc. The full algorithm is shown in Algorithm 7 and
we call it taa for short.
The solution in equation (4.9) exhibits sparsity features since: 1) for any
question, budget is allocated to only one of the crowds; and 2) when taking the
floor, difficult questions tend to get 0 budget while easy questions get the whole
share of the budget. We propose to address this problem by introducing an extra
regularization term which penalizes the sparse behavior of allocation in Algorithm 7.













j . Therefore the optimization problem
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Algorithm 7: Trust-Aware Assignment
Input: N tasks, budget B, worker cost cij(i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,M
Output: job allocations nij, predicted answer r̂i
Br = B;
for i = 1 : N do




for j = 1 : M do
























while Br > 0 and i ≤ N do
niji∗ = niji∗ + 1, Br = Br − ciji∗ , i = i+ 1
end



















nij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,M
(4.10)




















where ξ should be chosen such that nij is positive. We can see from this solution
structure that for each question, budget will be allocated to multiple crowds instead
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of just one. The penalty term in equation (4.10) gives credits to allocations that are
more spread out, which makes the bound closer to equation (4.8). The full algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 8 and we call it taap for short.
Algorithm 8: Trust-Aware Assignment With Penalty
Input: N tasks, budget B, worker cost cij(i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,M
Output: job allocations nij, predicted answer r̂i
Br = B;
for i = 1 : N do


























while Br > 0 do
for i = 1 : N do
if Br > 0 then
Randomly choose jth crowd






Use weighted majority voting to estimate answers
4.5 Theoretical performance bound
In this section, we discuss the performance of the allocation solution given by
our proposed trust-aware allocation by providing the guaranteed upper bound of
the error probability of the original optimization problem of equation (4.2).
Theorem 4.5.1. For any
∑





















Proof. We first derive the solution structure for equation (4.8). The Lagrangian
function is



















where {λ} and {νij} are the set of dual variables. According to the KKT conditions,
suppose for task i, the number of workers we assign to crowd j is positive, i.e. nij > 0,



















j2, which is usually the case, the optimal budget allocation strategy for task i is to
allocate partial budget to one and only one of the crowds j∗i . Therefore the opti-









. The dual variable λ is obtained by solving∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 nijcij − B = 0. To see what value j∗i takes, we plug nij back to equa-






























if j = j∗i
0 if j 6= j∗i





where i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Note that there might be multiple crowds that maximize the reliability-cost
ratio, in which case we can randomly choose from those crowds. However, the
performance bound is the same. We can pluggin nij back to equation (4.8) and
summing over tasks gets us the result in Theorem 4.5.1.
This result is intuitive in that the larger the budget we have, the lower the
error probability bound we can obtain. The bound improves exponentially with
respect to budget increase. In addition, lower cost of cij and higher trust value uij∗i
lead to lower error bound.
We can actually obtain an improved upper bound that holds with high prob-
ability from the perspective of PAC, like the work in [4].
Theorem 4.5.2. For any
∑
































Proof. The error probability in equation (4.7) holds with probability (1 − β)N . εi
can be determined by the solution in equation (4.9) through its relation with εi in
equation (4.6). Therefore, with probability (1−β)N , the following error probability
upper bound holds:































Summing over tasks i, we get the PAC upper bound for total error probability in
Theorem 4.5.2.
4.6 Experimental results
Besides the theoretical results given in Section 4.5, we also evaluate the perfor-
mance of our proposed trust-aware assignment (taa) and trust-aware assignment
with penalty (taap) on a real dataset and compared them against benchmark al-
gorithms such as uniform assignment (ua) and algorithms from [4] adjusted to our
setting, i.e. crowd-quality-seeking assignment (cqsa) and cheap assignment (ca).
We show that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art.
4.6.1 Benchmark Algorithms
The set of benchmark algorithms we use for comparison are:
109
1. ua: the algorithm tends to allocate the same number of people to answer a
question from each available crowd. If the budget is not used up, for each
question, it randomly chooses an expert from the set of crowds.
2. cqsa: for each question, the algorithm only chooses people from the most










where ji = arg max
j
wj If budget is not consumed, it iterates the question set
again and randomly chooses an expert from the set of crowds for each question.
3. ca: the algorithm only chooses the cheapest crowd (the least trustworthy









, where ji = arg min
j
wj.
The same procedure is done as in crowd-quality-seeking assignment when bud-
get is not used up.
After the assignment stage, weighted majority vote, as in equation (4.1), is applied
to the algorithms.
4.6.2 Experiment Setup on Galaxy Zoo Dataset
The real dataset we use is Galaxy Zoo [63], a set of galaxy annotations con-
tributed by a crowd of volunteers who are non-experts. The dataset contains statis-
tics about votes of these volunteers for over 900,000 galaxies. The images of these
galaxies are classified as elliptical (E), combined spiral (CS), or unknown by volun-
teers. The dataset from Galaxy Zoo used in this dissertation is SDSS image release
7. A subset of 700 galaxies that are classified as class elliptical or combined spiral
is randomly chosen. These classified galaxies have more than 80% agreement and
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the class agreed upon can be treated as truth label.
Classification of galaxy images from Galaxy Zoo does not have explicit dif-
ficulty levels and volunteers that participate in giving classifications do not have
explicit level of trust either. However, we first divide the 700 galaxies into 2 groups
based on the level of agreement. The first group is considered easy questions and
the second group is considered difficult questions. The level of agreement in the first
group is higher than that in the second. Then we simulate three kinds of crowds
with increasing level of trustworthiness. Let αt denote the difficulty parameter of
type t question and βj denote the trust parameter of type crowd j. Specifically αt
is scaled to [5.0, 1.0] for easy and difficult questions respectively and the β scaled
to [0.65, 0.85, 0.98]. Then we choose the trust value of crowd j toward question i
as a sigmoid function of αti and βj: uij =
1
1+exp(−αtiβj)
, where ti is the type of the
ith question, which is easy or difficult in our case. Next we assume the input from
the trust evaluation component is wij = 2uij − 1. In practice, this might not be the
case. However, any good design of trust evaluation algorithm should output higher
trust value for more reliable crowd and lower trust value for less reliable crowd and
the assumption that wij = 2uij − 1 also exhibits such behavior.
With these models, we choose the cost function that maps the question dif-
ficulty and crowd’s trust value to money in the following way: for easy questions,
the cost of different crowds is [0.1, 0.5, 0.9] and the cost for difficult questions is
[0.3, 0.6, 1.0]. The cost function along with the trustworthiness values captures the
following intuitive ideas: 1) for each question type, more trustworthy crowd incurs
higher cost; and 2) for a particular crowd, answering difficult questions incurs higher
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Trust-Aware Assignment with Penalty
Figure 4.1: Total error probability of algorithms uacqsacataataapon Galaxy
Zoo dataset with budget ranging from 50 to 1500.
cost than answering easy ones.
4.6.3 Analysis
To test the performance of our proposed algorithm, we plot the total proba-
bility of error as the budget increases from 50 to 1500. The result is depicted in
Fig. 4.1. It is easy to see that our proposed taap outperforms all other algorithms
across the span of budget. In particular, when the budget is relative small, i.e.
B ≤ 200, both taa and taap improve over cqsa and ua by up to 30%. This
indicates that our algorithms excel in efficient allocation when budget is not abun-
dant. Also, the cheap assignment algorithm does equally well when budget is small
since there is not enough budget for answering difficult questions and people from
a cheap crowd can answer easy questions equally well compared to an expensive
crowd. When the budget is abundant, however, taa behaves poorly compared to
other algorithms except for ca. This is due to two reasons: 1) taking the floor in
equation (4.9) makes many of the assignments 0, greatly deteriorating performance;
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Figure 4.2: Total error probability of algorithm taap on Galaxy Zoo dataset under
noise variance from 0 to 0.1 and the budget is from 50 to 1500.
and 2) the sparsity feature of equation (4.9), as mentioned earlier, did not switch to
most trustworthy crowd even if budget is very high. taap addresses this problem
and we can see that when budget is high, the algorithm does equally well compared
to cqsa and ua.
The result in Fig. 4.1 assumes the trustworthiness can be perfectly estimated.
Next we investigate the performance of taap when wij can not be perfectly esti-
mated. By adding a Gaussian noise ε to uij, we have wij = 2 (uij + ε)− 1. We test
taap with increasing variance of the noise ε ranging from 0 (perfectly estimated) to
0.1. Since uij takes value from [0.5, 1] in our case, 0.1 is a significant noise variance.
In Fig. 4.2, when budget is low, taap is to some extend affected by increasing noise
variance. However, the error rate never increases by more than 5%, which is accept-
able. When budget is sufficient, the algorithm is robust to varying noise variance




In this chapter, we considered the practical problem of budget allocation with
trust estimation of different crowds. We would like to maximize the prediction
accuracy within a given budget. In our setting, costs depend on both the question
and the crowds grouped by level of expertise. We relaxed this accuracy-cost trade-
off problem to a convex optimization problem by a PAC bound. We showed that
there is a simple and intuitive closed-form solution to the convex problem. taa







prediction error. In addition, to address the problem of flooring and
sparsity feature exhibited in taa, we proposed taap and showed its outstanding
performance through experiments on a real dataset across budget span.
Note that though we experimentally investigated the effect of trustworthiness
estimation error, we did not theoretically explore the effect of it on the total error
probability. We plan to further analyze this in the future. Additionally, the truth




In this dissertation, we proposed a trust model with various decision rules
based on local evidence in the setting of distributed consensus with adversaries.
The global trust evaluation (trust propagation) can be used to obtain more accu-
rate trust evaluation results if local evidences alone are not sufficient. The design of
the trust-aware consensus algorithm is flexible in that it can incorporate more deli-
cate decision rules and trust models. To evaluate the performance of the trust-aware
consensus algorithm, we provided both novel theoretical analysis on the security per-
formance in terms of miss detection rate and false alarm rate and emperical results
through simulations. For the theoretical performance, we analysed miss detection
rate and false alarm rate under regular trust graph assumption and more interest-
ingly, we provided the upper bound of the miss detection rate under general trust
graph assumption using probably approximately correct learning (PAC) techniques.
The theoretical results show that the rate decreases exponentially with respect to
the number of headers deployed and that smaller absorption probablities on ma-
licious nodes results in lower miss detection rate. These theoretical results serve
as useful guideline for practical design of distributed computation network and the
deployment of expensive headers in the network. For the emperical side, we ran sim-
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ulations and we showed that our proposed trust-aware consensus algorithm could
effectively detect various malicious strategies even in network with very low con-
nectivity. The results can be applied to distributed collaborative sensor networks,
sensor fusion and collaborative control.
In the distributed computation with supervisors setting, we investigated the
model of trust in crowdsourcing problems in face of adversaries. We proposed a prob-
abilistic model (mdc) that captures multi-domain characteristics of crowdsourcing
questions and multi-dimensional trust of workers’ knowledge. To show that our
model mdc is very flexible and extensible to incorporate additional metadata as-
sociated with questions, we proposed an extended model mdfc that incorporates
continuously-valued features of questions and mdtc that also combines topic dis-
covery. mdtc has the advantage that the domains are interpretable. We showed
that our proposed models have superior performance compared to state-of-the-art
on two real datasets and can effectively recover the trust vectors of workers. This
can be very useful in task assignment adaptive to workers’ trust values in different
dimensions in the future. We assume answers from workers are collected first and
are then fed to models for inference. The results in this problem can be applied for
fusion of information from multiple unreliable data sources instead of just workers
in the open crowd. Examples of data sources are sensors, human input, and infer-
ence results given by another system backed by a different set of machine learning
algorithms. Each of the data sources can be treated as a ”worker” in this disser-
tation and we can thereafter use models to estimate the multi-domain trust values
of the data sources and true labels of questions. Logical constraints between true
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label of questions and worker trusts can be utilized to enhance the performance of
trust estimation and true label estimation. We presented trust-aware crowdsourcing
with domain knowledge (tcdk), a unifying framework that combines the power of
domain knowledge and traditional crowdsourcing graphical model. It allows users to
express domain knowledge using first-order logic rules without redefining the model.
To estimate questions’ true labels and workers’ trust values, we develop a scalable
inference algorithm based on alternating consensus optimization. We demonstrate
that our model is superior to the state-of-the-art by testing it on two real datasets.
We also explored the problem of task allocation in crowdsourcing with ad-
versaries. We aimed maximize the prediction accuracy within a given budget. In
our setting, costs depend on both the question and the crowds grouped by level of
expertise. We relaxed this accuracy-cost trade-off problem to a convex optimization
problem by a PAC bound. We showed that there is a simple and intuitive closed-
form solution to the convex problem. taa always selects the most cost-efficient






prediction error. In ad-
dition, to address the problem of flooring and sparsity feature exhibited in taa, we
proposed taap and showed its outstanding performance through experiments on a
real dataset across budget span.
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